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[Wrapper enclosing clxvii. 267-76]
Rid Yourselves
Originally under .3. Creoles unwilling
Cause of aversion 5.
Letter 17 or 24 5. To the Interests of the ruling and influential few in Ultramaria the dominion would be particularly adverse.
Ultramaria injured.
[clxvii. 267]
1820 Aug. 30
Emancipation Spanish
.2. Creoles unwilling
2.4. Subrulers intolerable
Well now - this state of things suppose it to have place in any one of the provinces. When the expence of this military force is defrayed which, by the supposition, the population of the province being hostile, could not be defrayed from any other funds than those created by taxes and paid in Spain, where would be the expected saving in the amount of those same taxes? But sooner or later does it not appear unavoidable that, if any such taxes in the one quarter for the saving of taxes in another be \ZS\ upon, sooner or later, it can not but have place in all the provinces?
. .2. to Subrulers unendurable A.
So much as to the prospect of profit to subject many and ruling few in Spain in so far as depends submission on the part of the subject many in the Ultramarian provinces, or rather the subject many and the ruling and influential few taken together.
Now as to the prospect of profit to subject many in Spain in so far as depends on submission on the part of the ruling and influential few - the ruling class in these same provinces.
From official emolument from official situations with the profit /emolument power/ and honour attached to them but more particularly the emolument (for upon power and honour alone how preeminent /transcendant/ so ever man can not live) from this source can any adequate benefit in any shape adequate to the probable expence as above be reasonably be looked for in Spain by the ruling few?
The answer ventured /hazarded/ has already been in the negative. With exceptions to a certain extent /but/ constituting a small amount in proportion to the whole, antecedently to the change the whole /great/ mass of official emolument afforded by /attached to the duty of which are performed/ offices possessed in the Ultramarian provinces had in fact and practice been conferred to Spaniards: to men altogether unknown in the provinces in question, and sent out from Spain for the /undisguised/ professed purpose of receiving that emolument in the provinces at the expence of the inhabitants.
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Title: [[clxvii. 272] 1820. Aug. 29 Probation]Description: [clxvii. 272] 1820. Aug. 29 Probation Emancipation Spanish '.2. Creoles unwilling 2. To subrulers unendurable '' - to Subrulers unendurable. B. Whether it remitts to Spain any money or no, the Ultramaria province must /in the first place/ defray the expence of its own establishment: or else, instead of remitting to Spain, it must receive from thence a balance. This expence - supposing it confined within the bounds of necessity, and the amount of it (including the mass of emolument attached to the several portions of the /provincial and other/ local official establishment) given to natives of the provinces and unless /in so far as a material interchange has place among the province/ to an [...?] this expence - they would have no room for grudging, and would not grudge. Under these conditions, due regard would be paid to the interests of both classes: to that of the subject many by the moderateness of the burthen imposed by the taxes: to that of the ruling few by the equality of the distribution made of the benefit composed of the sweets of office. Well then:- taking in hand now the interest of the ruling few or rather subruling few in Ultramaria as distinguished from that of all together as above, and by being confined to that which consists in a participation with the ruling few of Spain in the sweets of office, in both countries together let us view how under the Constitutional Code /matters/? what has been done in favour of equality as to this point. The answer is - absolutely nothing: nothing in favour of any such or so much as professed: which only in the violation of it can the class of the ruling few in Spain find in the dominion over Ultramaria that portion of the advantage which forms the patrimony of their class. Of the functionaries the field of whose duty will be in a is mentioned as being to be found in a province, and thence in every Ultramarian province, I will beg your attention to three distinguishable classes: the mark of distinction I take from the circumstances of these receiving, or, not as far as appears, not receiving official emolument. In Class the first I place those for whom it is certain that emolument in a pecuniary shape is designed: These are The members of the several establishments following 1. The Ecclesiastical establishment 2. The Judicial Establishment 3. The Military Establishment: that branch which belongs to the armed Service with its Artillery and other stores [?]: that portion of the army the destination of which is to be quartered in the Province. 4. The Naval Establishment with its appendages as above: that part which is destined to remain in or near to the province, sometime in part, some time removing to the neighbourhood. 5. The Financial Establishment: consisting of the Offices named in Article 326 the Intendant, with his host of subordinates.
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Title: [[clxvii. 269] 1820 Aug. 30]Description: [clxvii. 269] 1820 Aug. 30 Emancipation Spanish .2. Creoles unwilling 2. to Subrulers unendurable In the case of several of the departments /establishments/ great care /anxiety/ is manifested to confine to nations the objects of desire respectively attached /belonging/ to their great anxiety to shut the door against strangers. Such is the letter: but so far as so far regards the population of the distant Ultramarian provinces, the effect is by no means conformable to the wish /desire/ expressed by it By /From/ the exclusion put in the case of the Ministers of State, the population of the distant Ultramarian provinces can not be stated as desiring any benefit: for small indeed is the probability of there being taken /chosen for the objects of these/ in any considerable proportion by the Council of State the seat of which is fixt in the capital of Spain. Not much greater benefit can they be considered /stated/ as reaping from the other exclusion which regards offices belonging to the Administration of Justice /Judicial department/. Little or no expectation can any native of any of those distant and [...?] regions of ever being chosen to fill in Spain an office belonging to the establishment in Spain, which on the other hand the inhabitants of those same distant provinces were /can/ not but be in the first place in the continual habit, in the next place in the continual expectation of seeing a part /in a portion/ more or less considerable filled by swarms of Spaniards sent /as before/ in the first place to find subsistence and in the next place if they can to make fortunes at the expense of the subject population of those distant desires subject many and ruling few together but more especially the ruling few whose property will afford the richest prey to the harpies of the law.
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Title: [[clxvii. 146] 1820. Aug. 30.]Description: [clxvii. 146] 1820. Aug. 30. Emancipation Spanish 3. Sole remedy,Despotism Under these circumstances /In any Ultramarian province/ both the many and the few being so necessarily and generally worse, let any one judge 1. In the first place what probability there can be, there in any considerable part of the whole extent any money sought /endeavoured/ to be raised by taxes for the purpose or under the expectation of its being sent away to Spain will be raised: 2. in the next place what probability there can be, that, to an amount for which it can appear to them worth the while to bear their part in the expence (?) of forced acquisition or vitiation of the dominion, any profit in the shape of official emolument is official patronage, can /will/ be received from the Ultramarian provinces or /either/ their provinces respectively or in Spain by the class of the ruling few. 1. First as to any money expected from taxes paid in one Ultramarian province. Till they have been assured that as far as it goes it will be applied to defray the expence necessary to the maintenance of government in its several departments in the province, the Provincial deputation will not freely give to the arrangements for levying the taxes any such approbation as by Art. \ZS\ is rendered necessary: and when a complete provision has there been made for the service of the province, /maintenance of government in/ they will not give their approbation for any thing more: for money the destination of which from which is instead of being returned to circulate on that same country from what it was taken is to be sent off to Spain for the use of a set of men to whose persons they are entire strangers. Well now - this state of things suppose it to have place in any one of the provinces. When the expence of this military force is defrayed which by the supposition, the population of a province being hostile could not be defrayed from any other funds than those created by taxes imposed on Spain, where would be the expected saving on the amount of these same taxes? But sooner or later, does it not appear unavoidable that if any such taxes on the one question for the saving of taxes or another be enlisted upon sooner or later it can not but have place in all the provinces?
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