JB_167_267.xml

Title: [[Wrapper enclosing clxvii. 267-76]]

Description: [Wrapper enclosing clxvii. 267-76]

Rid Yourselves

Originally under .3. Creoles unwilling

Cause of aversion 5.

Letter 17 or 24 5. To the Interests of the ruling and influential few in Ultramaria the dominion would be particularly adverse.

Ultramaria injured.

[clxvii. 267]

1820 Aug. 30

Emancipation Spanish

.2. Creoles unwilling

2.4. Subrulers intolerable

Well now - this state of things suppose it to have place in any one of the provinces. When the expence of this military force is defrayed which, by the supposition, the population of the province being hostile, could not be defrayed from any other funds than those created by taxes and paid in Spain, where would be the expected saving in the amount of those same taxes? But sooner or later does it not appear unavoidable that, if any such taxes in the one quarter for the saving of taxes in another be \ZS\ upon, sooner or later, it can not but have place in all the provinces?

. .2. to Subrulers unendurable A.

So much as to the prospect of profit to subject many and ruling few in Spain in so far as depends submission on the part of the subject many in the Ultramarian provinces, or rather the subject many and the ruling and influential few taken together.

Now as to the prospect of profit to subject many in Spain in so far as depends on submission on the part of the ruling and influential few - the ruling class in these same provinces.

From official emolument from official situations with the profit /emolument power/ and honour attached to them but more particularly the emolument (for upon power and honour alone how preeminent /transcendant/ so ever man can not live) from this source can any adequate benefit in any shape adequate to the probable expence as above be reasonably be looked for in Spain by the ruling few?

The answer ventured /hazarded/ has already been in the negative. With exceptions to a certain extent /but/ constituting a small amount in proportion to the whole, antecedently to the change the whole /great/ mass of official emolument afforded by /attached to the duty of which are performed/ offices possessed in the Ultramarian provinces had in fact and practice been conferred to Spaniards: to men altogether unknown in the provinces in question, and sent out from Spain for the /undisguised/ professed purpose of receiving that emolument in the provinces at the expence of the inhabitants.

167_146.xml

Title: [[clxvii. 146] 1820. Aug. 30.]

Description: [clxvii. 146]

1820. Aug. 30.

Emancipation Spanish

3. Sole remedy,Despotism

Under these circumstances /In any Ultramarian province/ both the many and the few being so necessarily and generally worse, let any one judge 1. In the first place what probability there can be, there in any considerable part of the whole extent any money sought /endeavoured/ to be raised by taxes for the purpose or under the expectation of its being sent away to Spain will be raised: 2. in the next place what probability there can be, that, to an amount for which it can appear to them worth the while to bear their part in the expence (?) of forced acquisition or vitiation of the dominion, any profit in the shape of official emolument is official patronage, can /will/ be received from the Ultramarian provinces or /either/ their provinces respectively or in Spain by the class of the ruling few.

1. First as to any money expected from taxes paid in one Ultramarian province. Till they have been assured that as far as it goes it will be applied to defray the expence necessary to the maintenance of government in its several departments in the province, the Provincial deputation will not freely give to the arrangements for levying the taxes any such approbation as by Art. \ZS\ is rendered necessary: and when a complete provision has there been made for the service of the province, /maintenance of government in/ they will not give their approbation for any thing more: for money the destination of which from which is instead of being returned to circulate on that same country from what it was taken is to be sent off to Spain for the use of a set of men to whose persons they are entire strangers.

Well now - this state of things suppose it to have place in any one of the provinces. When the expence of this military force is defrayed which by the supposition, the population of a province being hostile could not be defrayed from any other funds than those created by taxes imposed on Spain, where would be the expected saving on the amount of these same taxes? But sooner or later, does it not appear unavoidable that if any such taxes on the one question for the saving of taxes or another be enlisted upon sooner or later it can not but have place in all the provinces?

JB_167_268.xml

Title: [[clxvii. 268] 1820. August 30.]

Description: [clxvii. 268]

1820. August 30.

Emancipation Spanish

.2. Creoles unwilling

2. to Subrulers unendurable

/In relation to this matter /head// An arrangement or at least a practice which on the part of the framers of the Constitution could /can/ scarcely have failed to be in contemplation in the character of an expedient which might eventually come to be resorted to, is - the letting the natives into a participation /share/ to an extent more or less considerable, in the mass of these objects of general desire.

But, in the first place, even suppose this plan of policy generally satisfactory to the class in question in the Ultramarian provinces, no such satisfaction were it even universal would suffice to secure to the ruling few in Spain the undisturbed dominion /possession of the desired/ in those same Ultramarian provinces. The reason has been seen. To the /In the eyes/ subject many in these same provinces this advantage to the class of the ruling few would be as nothing /of no value/; and under the Election system, as above, in the will of the subject many it would depend whether the office of a member of the Provincial Deputation should ever be filled by a person /an individual/ disposed to give her approbation to any such taxes as might be required.

2. In the next place neither does it seem probable that by any such participation /share/ as the ruling few in Spain would be disposed /could bring themselves/ to concede, that same class in the Ultramarian provinces would to any considerable extent be satisfied.

To Spanish American eyes countrymen in name, individuals sent from Spain to fill beneficial /and desirable and deserved/ offices in Spanish America, would not the less present themselves, were they ever so many, were they ever so few, in the character of foreign intruders. The frame being regarded on the same footing /in the same light as, and not more unfavourable than/ foreigners at large, they would naturally present themselves in a light much more unfavourable. Coming as before the change they had uniformly done in the character of masters, now after the changes they would present themselves in the character of angry masters, defrauded by a sort of rebellion of a portion more or less considerable of their accustomed and of old-established rights. Thus Between these remaining children of the old system and the children of the new system there would be a perpetual source of discord. The inhabitants of the Ultramarian provinces to which they were sent to make a profit out of them at their expence would be the persons so sent as were the bulk of the inhabitants of France, to the returned and in part only reinstated children of the Ancien regime.