date

PRIVATE Constit. France 1792-3
PRIVATE

Constit. France 1792-3

The faculty of All Government depends upon /is constituted by/ the disposition to obedience.

The surest pledge of disposition is habit.

Disposition as far as depends upon reason can be looked for only from the privileged few /superiorly instructed and enlightened few/

Disposition as far as results /resulting/ from habit may be looked for from the many.

There is no virtue in absolute monarchy, mixt monarchy or republicanism distinct from utility

In England it is /is and long has been/ a crime to endure any other sort of government than the particular sort of mixt monarchy there established In France it is at present a still greater crime to endure any thing but a democratical republic.

The first end or object is security: the next is equality.

Security stands before equality: because where there is most inequality, no man's condition, the condition of the lowest is not so bad, but that want of security may make it worse.

Civil liberty is comprehended in security.

What has contributed most to raise the passion for political liberty is its having obtained the same name of liberty with the civil.

Political liberty, even in its utmost conceivable state of perfection, is not itself an ultimate /a proper/ end of government: it is valuable only as a means to the two ultimate ends of security and equality.

A Republic requires more intelligence than even a mixt monarchy: as it is the bulk who govern, things will never go on well till even the bulk are well informed.

If once it is well established it promises to be the most lasting of governments: for there is nothing beyond.

The Euthanasia of the British Constitution is a Republic.

The French in forming a Republic are sacrificing the happiness of the present generation to that of the future.
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