167_079.xml

Title: [[clxvii. 79] 1820. Aug. 17.]

Description: [clxvii. 79]

1820. Aug. 17.

Rid yourselves of Ultramaria

'5. Corruptive influence

Townsend

In a pure Monarchy - in a government in which there is no Cortes - no representation of the people - government being carried on by the single will of a Monarch - carried on by his uncontroulable force, corruptive influence has no place: there is no coordinate power for it to be exercised upon :- there is, accordingly, no need of it: the will of Blackstone's Gad upon earth is done without it. Such was the case with Spain, antecedently to the late happy change.

Where not only the business of the legislative department is carried on by a representative body, the members of which are, all of them, immediately, or by the intervention of others, chosen and removable by the subject many, but the members of the Executive Department likewise are, all of them, chosen and removable on the same principle, in such sort, taht every functionary of government, without exception, is thus chosen and removable, and, if need be, punishable, corruptive influence has no power. Let it be conceived, for a moment, that by the influence, exercised by means of such or such a mass of patronage, in the hands of the Chief or any other Member of the Executive body, a mojority of the members of the Legislative body have, on such and such an occasion, been induced to sacrifice, in such and such a way, the interests of their Constituents. For the purpose of the argument, this, like any other improbable supposition, may be entertained. But, under the system of arrangements just stated, the improbability of any such incident is, on the face of it, so glaring, that to enter into details for the proof of it, would be a waste of words. Such is the case with the Anglo-American United States.

In a mixt Monarchy, in which, though the business of the legislative department is carried on by a representative body, the members of which are, all of them, as above, immediately or by the intervention of others, chosen and removable by the subject many, at the same time that, in the same department, there exists one functionary, namely the Monarch by whom, seated as he is not by choice but by consanguinity, and nto removable, as above, the validity of any act of ligislation may be suspended for an indeterminate length of time, and who, in the filling of situations conferring pecuniary profit, power, and factitious dignity, has a share more or less ample, corruptive influence can not but have more or less power and efficacy.

As

167_085.xml

Title: [[clxvii. 85] 1821 March 22]

Description: [clxvii. 85]

1821 March 22

Rid Yourselves

Anti Constitut. Evil 2

2. Corruptive influence

In whatever political state /Wherever/, in addition to a body of functionaries invested with supreme legislative power, but at the same time chosen /elected/, and by frequency of election, removable by the people, there exists another functionary or set of functionaries who not being so elected or removable nor yet by any exercise of the power of the people punishable have at their disposal any considerable mass of money or other of the sweets of government, the /those/ functionaries /members of the supreme/ who as above are more or less dependent on the people, will by the possession or prospect of shares in those same sweets be placed in such a state of dependence on the distribution of those same sweets as to /will/ cause them to concurr in the promoting of the particular and sinister interest of this independent set of functionaries, to the prejudice and by the sacrifice and to the prejudice of the universal interest. To be in this way and by the operation of this cause induced thus to make sacrifice of the universal to the particular and sinister interest is to be obsequious /yield/ to the force of corruptive influence. Correspondent correlative and proportioned to the efficiency of corruptive influence on the one part is corrupt obsequiousness on the other.

Of this corruptive influence the efficiency will from the beginning of things bating some special interposition on the part of the people be continually on the increase, till it has converted these originally removable agents of the people, into so many instruments of a virtual despotism of a government in which, as /not less/ compleatly than under a despotism governing by force, the universal interest will be made a complete sacrifice of to that knot of particular and sinister interests, and the people subjected to an all-comprehensive course /system/ of depredation and oppression, exercised over them by these their rulers: the amount of the plundering having no other limit than that which is set to it by the solvency of the subject many: by the quantity of the mass of wealth which the subject many are able to give up to their rulers, without perishing themselves for want of it.

167_061.xml

Title: [[clxvii. 61] 1821 March 22]

Description: [clxvii. 61]

1821 March 22

Rid Yourselves

' Anti-Constitution

1. Vitiating Cortes Constitution

True it is - as in the body natural so in the body politic so it may be that of one poison the effect is counteracted and more or less done away by another. If so it be that the effect of the claim in the way of corruptive influence is as you say to place the members of the legislative body /chosen by the people/ in a state of corrupt subjection of those of the Executive department not chosen by the people, on the Ultramarian Members will this same influence be exercised as well as on the Peninsular Members.

Admitted. But for this supposed antidote the people in the peninsular what will they /their position/ be the better? In nothing: the effect will be [to] place them under the dominion of an /a domestic/ interest still more constantly interfering with their own and counteracting and overbearing it than foreign and distant interest can be. You will still be under the government of men by the amount of the effective force of corruptive influence inclinated by a particular interest opposite to your share in the universal interest.