date

15 Novr 1813 Omitt this page 5 Aug 1815
15 Novr 1813 Omitt this page 5 Aug 1815?

Antimir Price and Campbel

2

Ch.1. Beginning

2

In the first place, for simplicity's sake, suppose a single narrator, by whom the state of things in question is reported as having made itself manifested to his senses in the character of a percipient witness. In having taken observation of it in the character of a percipient witness.

Was he himself deceived? on the occasion of the report so made by him, is the case such that not being himself deceived, he has altered this report knowing it to be false and thus if not expressly labouring to deceive, aware of the effect which in proportion to the credence given to it, it can not but have as to the deceiving others?—In either of these cases though by him the state of things in question has been represented by him as not really having at the time and place in question having had place in truth, it is unreal—in truth at the time and place in question it had not place.

Let the state of things as thus reported be such as to any view of the matter presents itself as being in itself improbable, that is of such a sort as to be more or less unconformable to the ordinary scheme of nature: viz [...?] of that which has presented itself to my observation and reflection as being in relation to the state of things in question the ordinary course of nature: in which case the probative/ direct evidence composed of the testimony of the narrator, finds standing in opposition to it this uncomformity in the character of a mass of disprobative circumstantial evidence.
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  • Title: [15 Nov r 1813 Omitt this page 8 Aug. 1815]
    Description: 15 Nov r 1813 Omitt this page 8 Aug. 1815?

    Antimir Price & Campbel

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    Ch. Beginning

    3

    Of the two opposite states of things which then is it that presents itself to my judgment as most improbable? On the one hand, the verity of the state of things in question or on the other hand the verity of the proposition that in reporting what he has thus reported, the reporter was a deceiver or deceived—a person himself labouring under a deception, or a person the tendency of whose report whether to himself were or were not deceived in respect of it, was to produce deception on the part of every person by whom credence should have been given to it.

    In other and more compressed language—the truth or the falshood of the report—which of them is the most improbable the verity of the report or the falsity of it?
  • Title: [Another version of this material at 29,806]
    Description: Another version of this material at 29,806-151.

    15 Nov r 1813  Omitt this page? 5 Aug 1815?

    Antimir Price & Campbel

    1

    Campbel

    Ch 1 Beginning

    1

    The This sentence crossed through in pencil. Unreasonableness of Credulity: or Improbability a just cause of disbelief: or Campbel and Price—their reasons for the belief of what is improbable examined.

    Of two incompatible—i.e. mutually incompatible states of things, that is most worthy of evidence—say in one word credence- worthy,+ which is most

    probable; or what comes to the same thing, least

    improbable?

    That to the truth of this proposition any objection should ever have been made is what upon the first mention of it a man would be apt not to look upon as possible. The contrary however will be found but too plainly manifested by experience.

    By one or more persons in the alledged character of percipient witnesses a certain state of things is reported as having at a particular point of time in a particular local situation been manifested. Of the state of things, the existence of which is thus reported to me shall I believe or disbelieve the existence? Upon what circumstance will my option between belief and disbelief depend? As to belief upon authority: in the present case this is out of the question: for, in so far as authority is trusted to, option has no place.

    In the present case therefore let the [...?] belief and disbelief in question be of the indigenous kind. This supposed, my answer can be no other than this: upon the comparative degree of probability between the two proposed opposite and incompatible facts the exemplification of the state of things thus reported, and the falsity of the report or narrative by which it is declared to have had place.

    Note (a)?

    + (a) Credible means—not fitness for, but capacity of being believed, incredible, incapacity of being believed. In this sense what the use made of the termination -ble Latin—bilis considered as the only purpose, an incredible proposition is a sort of proposition that would not be to be found any where exemplified.
  • Title: [9 Aug 1815 Jug. True D + ]
    Description: 9 Aug 1815

    Jug. True

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    I Prolego

    Ch. Time of penning

    1

    §.1. Length of time

     N.B. the question to the time of penning is subservient to that of the trustworthiness of the penman. It goes not to probity but to intelligence viz. in respect of [...?] of information.

    Causes of diminution of trustworthiness by time 1. Author known, 2. Author unknown.

    When the [...?] i.e. Reporting author is known—viz. more or less perfectly 1) The supposed percipient witness mentioned by the author 2) The supposed percipient witness not mentioned

    II. When the Author is unknown

    §. Interval between the fact and the penning of the history—how by the length of it trustworthiness is diminished.

    The greater the distance between the times at which the events and states of things reported as having had place, and the times at which the reports made of them were respectively penned the less trustworthy is the report: and this for several reasons.

    For that diminution—in the degree of trustworthiness several causes may be assigned.

    Note in margin at this point: ‘ Go on and assign them.’

    1. The most favourable case—the case in which the loss of trustworthiness produced by the length of the interval between the time of the supposed action and the time of committing to paper the statement made of it is at its minimum—is that when the supposed percipient witness is himself the reporter or reporting witness by whom the account of what passed or is supposed to have passed is penned. In this case the sources from which misrepresentation is liable to flow are MS alt. ‘reducible’. no more than three viz: 1. Diminution of the retentive power of the memory, thence want of correctness or compleatness, or both in the appropriate pictures which had been [made] in and by the memory: pictures of the events and states of things of which in and by the narrator, a description is undertaken to be given.

    2. In the first instance supposing the intention of maintaining these quantities [of] the correctness and compleatness, chance which there may be, that by some change in the state and condition of the narrator in respect of his connection with the events or states of things in question in the way of interests. Note in margin at this point: ‘ Oct 1815 Go on.’

    1.

    By length of interval between the fact and the penning of the narrating witness’s history trustworthiness is diminished.

    2.

    Causes of diminution.

    1. In the most favourable case loss by length of interval a minimum. Supposed percipient witness, the reporting witness. Sources of diminution here, three 1. Diminution of retentive power, thence want of correctness or compleatness in the picture retained. 2. Chance of a supervening mendacity-prompting interest or interests begotten prejudice.