15 Nov r 1813 Omitt this page 8 Aug. 1815?

Antimir Price & Campbel

3

Ch. Beginning

3

Of the two opposite states of things which then is it that presents itself to my judgment as most improbable? On the one hand, the verity of the state of things in question or on the other hand the verity of the proposition that in reporting what he has thus reported, the reporter was a deceiver or deceived—a person himself labouring under a deception, or a person the tendency of whose report whether to himself were or were not deceived in respect of it, was to produce deception on the part of every person by whom credence should have been given to it.

In other and more compressed language—the truth or the falshood of the report—which of them is the most improbable the verity of the report or the falsity of it?
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  • Title: [Another version of this material at 29,806]
    Description: Another version of this material at 29,806-151.

    15 Nov r 1813  Omitt this page? 5 Aug 1815?

    Antimir Price & Campbel

    1

    Campbel

    Ch 1 Beginning

    1

    The This sentence crossed through in pencil. Unreasonableness of Credulity: or Improbability a just cause of disbelief: or Campbel and Price—their reasons for the belief of what is improbable examined.

    Of two incompatible—i.e. mutually incompatible states of things, that is most worthy of evidence—say in one word credence- worthy,+ which is most

    probable; or what comes to the same thing, least

    improbable?

    That to the truth of this proposition any objection should ever have been made is what upon the first mention of it a man would be apt not to look upon as possible. The contrary however will be found but too plainly manifested by experience.

    By one or more persons in the alledged character of percipient witnesses a certain state of things is reported as having at a particular point of time in a particular local situation been manifested. Of the state of things, the existence of which is thus reported to me shall I believe or disbelieve the existence? Upon what circumstance will my option between belief and disbelief depend? As to belief upon authority: in the present case this is out of the question: for, in so far as authority is trusted to, option has no place.

    In the present case therefore let the [...?] belief and disbelief in question be of the indigenous kind. This supposed, my answer can be no other than this: upon the comparative degree of probability between the two proposed opposite and incompatible facts the exemplification of the state of things thus reported, and the falsity of the report or narrative by which it is declared to have had place.

    Note (a)?

    + (a) Credible means—not fitness for, but capacity of being believed, incredible, incapacity of being believed. In this sense what the use made of the termination -ble Latin—bilis considered as the only purpose, an incredible proposition is a sort of proposition that would not be to be found any where exemplified.
  • Title: [15 Novr 1813 Omitt this page 5 Aug 1815]
    Description: 15 Novr 1813 Omitt this page 5 Aug 1815?

    Antimir Price and Campbel

    2

    Ch.1. Beginning

    2

    In the first place, for simplicity's sake, suppose a single narrator, by whom the state of things in question is reported as having made itself manifested to his senses in the character of a percipient witness. In having taken observation of it in the character of a percipient witness.

    Was he himself deceived? on the occasion of the report so made by him, is the case such that not being himself deceived, he has altered this report knowing it to be false and thus if not expressly labouring to deceive, aware of the effect which in proportion to the credence given to it, it can not but have as to the deceiving others?—In either of these cases though by him the state of things in question has been represented by him as not really having at the time and place in question having had place in truth, it is unreal—in truth at the time and place in question it had not place.

    Let the state of things as thus reported be such as to any view of the matter presents itself as being in itself improbable, that is of such a sort as to be more or less unconformable to the ordinary scheme of nature: viz [...?] of that which has presented itself to my observation and reflection as being in relation to the state of things in question the ordinary course of nature: in which case the probative/ direct evidence composed of the testimony of the narrator, finds standing in opposition to it this uncomformity in the character of a mass of disprobative circumstantial evidence.
  • Title: [15 Novr 1813  Omitt this page? 5 Aug 1815]
    Description: 15 Novr 1813  Omitt this page? 5 Aug 1815?

    Antimir Price and Campbel

    4

    Ch. Beginning

    4

     The Case of many witnesses remains to be inserted.

    Incontestable as the footing for judgment antecedently to any particular application of it this /ground/ mode of stating the ground of division as between belief and disbelief may appear to be, established systems there are to the credit of which it has to certain minds presented itself as not favourable.

    The following accordingly, (in so far as notions in themselves indistinct and self contradictory can find any adequate expression in a set of words in the putting of which together clearness as well as verity of expression has been the object of the most solicitous endeavours) the following is the proposition that has found advocates:—

    (2)

    Of any reported fact, the improbability how great soever how high soever the degree of it, can not afford an adequate ground for the disbelief of it, against the positive report made of it by human testimony.