date

5 May 1812 Credulity 2
5 May 1812

Credulity

2

Ch 1

2

 After a sort of definitional and anticipative account of each as per Rudiment Sheet Col [N-O/E-G.] proceed as follows. Ipsi dixit philosophy its logic as Applied to morals, I believe this to be right therefore it is right: that to be wrong, therefore it is wrong. Applied to intellectuals: I believe this to be true: therefore it is true.

Of these two works both written in the same spirit and for the same purpose D r Campbel's is the one that by many titles claims to be the first examined.

1. It forms a part of a sort of system of irrationality of misreasoning which though it sprung up in England has taken root and spread to a prodigious extent in Scotland has spread over and infected the ear of the principal source of instruction in that country philosophical no less than religion: it may be termed as the philosophy of Pythagoras was in its day the philosophy of Ipse

dixit.

2. The extent of the ground taken by this principle is much greater than that of the ground taken by D r Price. In the ground it professes to cover are contained as well things probable as things improbable.

3. The occasion on which it was written owes the publication of a work of David Hume viz. his Essays: in which work is contained his Essay on Miracles, of which the work of D r Campbel undertakes the refutation: and as will appear it is supposed in the sequel of those pages, Hume's argument having a weakness in the mode of putting it Campbel in the attack he made upon it, had in some considerable respects the advantage.
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  • Title: [Another version of this material at 29,806]
    Description: Another version of this material at 29,806-151.

    15 Nov r 1813  Omitt this page? 5 Aug 1815?

    Antimir Price & Campbel

    1

    Campbel

    Ch 1 Beginning

    1

    The This sentence crossed through in pencil. Unreasonableness of Credulity: or Improbability a just cause of disbelief: or Campbel and Price—their reasons for the belief of what is improbable examined.

    Of two incompatible—i.e. mutually incompatible states of things, that is most worthy of evidence—say in one word credence- worthy,+ which is most

    probable; or what comes to the same thing, least

    improbable?

    That to the truth of this proposition any objection should ever have been made is what upon the first mention of it a man would be apt not to look upon as possible. The contrary however will be found but too plainly manifested by experience.

    By one or more persons in the alledged character of percipient witnesses a certain state of things is reported as having at a particular point of time in a particular local situation been manifested. Of the state of things, the existence of which is thus reported to me shall I believe or disbelieve the existence? Upon what circumstance will my option between belief and disbelief depend? As to belief upon authority: in the present case this is out of the question: for, in so far as authority is trusted to, option has no place.

    In the present case therefore let the [...?] belief and disbelief in question be of the indigenous kind. This supposed, my answer can be no other than this: upon the comparative degree of probability between the two proposed opposite and incompatible facts the exemplification of the state of things thus reported, and the falsity of the report or narrative by which it is declared to have had place.

    Note (a)?

    + (a) Credible means—not fitness for, but capacity of being believed, incredible, incapacity of being believed. In this sense what the use made of the termination -ble Latin—bilis considered as the only purpose, an incredible proposition is a sort of proposition that would not be to be found any where exemplified.
  • Title: [Headings and some notes in text by Bentham]
    Description: Headings and some notes in text by Bentham, text in the hand of Colls.

    1821 March 3

    Jug. Util and True

    10

    Plan of the Work

    Part III. Revealed at large. Verity considered.

    10

     Here copy the titles of the Chapters. Note by Bentham in red ink.

    Part III.

    On the usefulness of Supposed Revealed Religion at large—verity considered.

    Ch.1.

    Notion that belief is the only safe course, and that therefore a deaf ear should be turned to all disprobative arguments: its absurdity and fallaciousness exposed.

    Ch.2.

    The facts assumed are, in all supposed Revealed Religions, destitute of all support from trustworthy evidence: the falsity of the statement is always more probable than the verity of it. No judicial decision would be regarded as warranted by such evidence.

    Ch.3.

    Supposed proof from miracles—its improbativeness. Witnesses, none: miracle non: nothing but the report of one.

    Ch.4.

    Supposed proof from predictions—its disprobativeness.

    §.1. Predictions, supposed preternatural, classed.

    §.2. Relation between supposed supernatural predictions, and other miracles.

    Ch.5.

    D r. Campbel's answer. Belief is the work of sense. Sense being infallible, belief proves the truth of everything believed—the absurdity exposed.

    Ch.6.

    D r. Price's answer to the objection of improbability—improbabilities are continually happening—the fallacy exposed.

    Ch.7.

    Propensity to believe improbable things—its causes natural and factitous

    §.1. Man at large—why credulous—credulous in proportion to their ignorance /ignorance the cause and measure of credulity/

    §.2. Medical men—why incredulous.

    §.3. Factitious, or less immediate causes—Priestcraft—groundless fear, from invisible sources, employed as an instrument of dominion. See Part II. Ch.8.
  • Title: [1819 Mar. 10 Jug. Util. Verity]
    Description: 1819 Mar. 10

    Jug. Util.

    Verity

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    Price and Campbel

    II. Campbel

    (2)

    So much for the Revered D r Price. Now for the Reverend D r Campbel. There we have the South Briton? here we have the North Briton.

    Improbability—disconformity to the ordinary course of nature—if that be what you mean by miraculousness—is no ground for disbelief, appears no bar to belief. For the trial of /as between such/ conformity and disconformity is a tedious and precarious process. For distinguishing truth from falshood God has given us an instrument which can never err: at least let the /supposed fact/ miracle be ever so miraculous /extraordinary/, the instrument will serve us at pleasure for proving it to be true. This instrument is a believing

    sense. We have one sense for seeing; we have another for believing. If the correctness of our belief depended on the judgment of the judicial faculty yes: then indeed in believing an alledged miracle we might believe erroneously. But it depends upon perception: it depends on sense: we have a sense in purpose: and that sense can not be deceived: at any rate in such a case as that in question, when the difference between eternal torment /bliss/ and eternal bliss /torment/ depends upon belief and disbelief, /deceived/ it will not be deceived.

    Alas! alas! belief in act of simple perception, and not of the judgement! that judgment /the judicial faculty/ should be said to have no encrease[?] in it. Marginal note: ‘This too was the notion of David Hume.’ When even in the case of sight, where sense has really so large a share in the business, judgement has also a share, and by /in/ its decisions man is so frequently deceived! /Look to the East/ What is it that terminates the horizon? a mountain says the judgment: the wind shifts, the mountain is blown away: it was nothing but a cloud /the mountain was a cloud.