date

9 Novr 1811 Evidence (or rather Anti
9 Novr 1811

Evidence (or rather Anti [...?] /Jug. false/

1. Theoretic

Ch. Persuasion

§. Reid & Campbel

1

§.3

Since the publication of that work of David Hume another set of philosophers have appeared according to whose belief affirmative persuasion is not an act of the judgement, nor yet the result of a certaindegree of vividness in the idea or image of the supposed matter of fact in question but the result of the operation of a particular sort of sense a sense as much as any of the five senses a sense made for the purpose, and though not one of the five, as true as sense as any of them.

So inadequate will the cause thus assigned be found to be to the effect produced, that unless a slight intimation were given of the necessity by which the demand for this hypothesis was produced, it may be a matter of difficulty to achieve wonder and admiration how it should ever have come into existence.

A certain class of cases had been noted in which the authority of the judgment was found to sit uneasy. A warrant was wanted for bestowing belief upon a class of supposed facts which by the judgment it was apprehended might be were impossible.
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    According to David Hume alone of any supposed matter of fact the idea which his plan in a mans mind is to a certain degree vivid, the supposed matter of fact is by that same man believed: if the vividness has not risen to that necessary degree, the matter of fact is not believed, belief in regard to it has no place.

    On this occasion the state of the mind called disbelief seems scarcely to have presented itself to his notice: by the affirmative phases of persuasion viz the opposite case belief his attention seems to have been engrossed. Had the two equally existing modes of persuasion obtained each of them that equal/share of attention which was its due, the need of looking out for some common term, equally applicable to both, such as the word persuasion would naturally have presented itself to so acute a mind.

    In respect of conception or memory or both degree of vividness the sole difference between belief and disbelief or rather between belief and un-belief. Such was Humes theory. How stands the matter of fact, as testified by memorial[?] experience? an experience to which hurried away by the warmth of the philosophical pursuit his attention could never find the opportunity for applying itself.
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    Having judgment itself for its opponent this hypothesis could not but find itself labouring under very serious difficulties.

    1. Out of two cases, of each of which the existence is equally undividable, for one alone did it so much as take upon itself to give account. For the act of belief as often as examined upon testimony, it provided a believing sense—a testimony-believing sense. But while in some instances testimony is believed in others it is disbelieved: of them to account for belief of testimony there be a need of a believing sense to account for disbelief of testimony there exits not less need of a disbelieving sense.

    The believing sense being infallible, how is it with the disbelieving sense? If this be not infallible likewise, [...?] will be expected to account for the difference.

    If both be alike infallible, here we every now and then have two senses one pronouncing a fact true, the other pronouncing the same thing not true: each contradicting the other, and both of them infallible.
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    In the case of a judgment, a propensity to pass it would not be regarded as sufficiency to prove it just.

    The principle of much evidence, in credulity precluding all MS ‘all all’. argument all inquiry—all examination. Try it upon [...?] &c. The principle of experience puts every thing upon a case of examination : and furnishes a clue.

    To A to whom the object of belief is believed the hypothesis of a believing sense presents nothing which on that occasion he has any much need to quarrel with.

    But to B. the same fact is an object of disbelief. The believing sense by which A is warranted in the belief of this same fact is there any thing in it that is to expect B who he has no such sense to give up his disbelief and act as if he had that sense which by the supposition he has not?

    What the hypothesis goes to is this viz. that whatever proposition finds any person to believe it is true, for, short of this, no place can be found at which it can be stopped. I have a believing sense: this you can not deny: you yourself assure me that I have. Well then the believing sense I have consulted and the information it gives me is that the proposition is true now against this whatsoever any other person may find to say, what is it that you can find? Such is the language which to any one by whom this theory is maintained every other person that pleases has a right to use and that right an indisputable one.

    But what are the propositions for which this theory is needed, and to which the benefit of it is applied? Such propositions and such alone as are in themselves improbable: for as to those such as are probable there is not one of them that has any need of it.