date

9 Nov r 1811 Evidence 1. Theoretical
9 Nov r 1811

Evidence

1. Theoretical

Ch Persuasive Causes

§.3 Reid & Campbel

2

Conformity to the experienced nature of men and things had by other hands been held up to view as the standard of trustworthiness in testimony. If verityon the part of the fact reported be more disconformable to the experienced nature of things, than on the part of the reporting witness or witnesses falshood is to the experienced nature of man, in that case it was said, not belief but disbelief is the proper judgment to be passed—is the sort of judgment required by reason in this case.

But in the case in question what was required and desired was that upon the credit of human testimony delivered by witnesses who were not at hand to be subjected to interrogation belief should be given to facts of which it was the offence[?] not to be conformable to, to be in an [...?] degree disconformable to the experienced nature of things.

Under such circumstances to afford for credence a sufficient warrant, the only resource that seemed to be left was to create a source which, at [...?] partaking of that infallibility which in common intendent has been attributed to the few belonging to the old set, should havesufficient authority to over-rule the judgment and reverse its dictates.
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  • Title: [9 Nov r 1811 Evidence 3]
    Description: 9 Nov r 1811

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    Having judgment itself for its opponent this hypothesis could not but find itself labouring under very serious difficulties.

    1. Out of two cases, of each of which the existence is equally undividable, for one alone did it so much as take upon itself to give account. For the act of belief as often as examined upon testimony, it provided a believing sense—a testimony-believing sense. But while in some instances testimony is believed in others it is disbelieved: of them to account for belief of testimony there be a need of a believing sense to account for disbelief of testimony there exits not less need of a disbelieving sense.

    The believing sense being infallible, how is it with the disbelieving sense? If this be not infallible likewise, [...?] will be expected to account for the difference.

    If both be alike infallible, here we every now and then have two senses one pronouncing a fact true, the other pronouncing the same thing not true: each contradicting the other, and both of them infallible.
  • Title: [9 Novr 1811 Evidence 9]
    Description: 9 Novr 1811

    Evidence

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    § 1

    Against Hume and Campbel - therefore pass up?

    When testimony as well as when material evidence evidence ab intrà is the subject, belief then is an act of the judgment: Disbelief the opposite in like manner an act of the judgment. If these be not acts of the judgment neither are any others. If there be not in mans nature that sort of faculty to which the name of judgment has been attributed, neither does there exist in it any other sort of faculty. If there be not operations of that faculty, neither are any others.
  • Title: [9 Nov r 1811 Evidence 1. Theoretic]
    Description: 9 Nov r 1811

    Evidence

    1. Theoretic

    Ch. Persuasive Causes

    § 3 Reid & Campbel

    4

    In the case of a judgment, a propensity to pass it would not be regarded as sufficiency to prove it just.

    The principle of much evidence, in credulity precluding all MS ‘all all’. argument all inquiry—all examination. Try it upon [...?] &c. The principle of experience puts every thing upon a case of examination : and furnishes a clue.

    To A to whom the object of belief is believed the hypothesis of a believing sense presents nothing which on that occasion he has any much need to quarrel with.

    But to B. the same fact is an object of disbelief. The believing sense by which A is warranted in the belief of this same fact is there any thing in it that is to expect B who he has no such sense to give up his disbelief and act as if he had that sense which by the supposition he has not?

    What the hypothesis goes to is this viz. that whatever proposition finds any person to believe it is true, for, short of this, no place can be found at which it can be stopped. I have a believing sense: this you can not deny: you yourself assure me that I have. Well then the believing sense I have consulted and the information it gives me is that the proposition is true now against this whatsoever any other person may find to say, what is it that you can find? Such is the language which to any one by whom this theory is maintained every other person that pleases has a right to use and that right an indisputable one.

    But what are the propositions for which this theory is needed, and to which the benefit of it is applied? Such propositions and such alone as are in themselves improbable: for as to those such as are probable there is not one of them that has any need of it.