date

9 Nov r 1811 Evidence 1. Theoretic
9 Nov r 1811

Evidence

1. Theoretic

Ch. Persuasive Causes

§ 3 Reid & Campbel

4

In the case of a judgment, a propensity to pass it would not be regarded as sufficiency to prove it just.

The principle of much evidence, in credulity precluding all MS ‘all all’. argument all inquiry—all examination. Try it upon [...?] &c. The principle of experience puts every thing upon a case of examination : and furnishes a clue.

To A to whom the object of belief is believed the hypothesis of a believing sense presents nothing which on that occasion he has any much need to quarrel with.

But to B. the same fact is an object of disbelief. The believing sense by which A is warranted in the belief of this same fact is there any thing in it that is to expect B who he has no such sense to give up his disbelief and act as if he had that sense which by the supposition he has not?

What the hypothesis goes to is this viz. that whatever proposition finds any person to believe it is true, for, short of this, no place can be found at which it can be stopped. I have a believing sense: this you can not deny: you yourself assure me that I have. Well then the believing sense I have consulted and the information it gives me is that the proposition is true now against this whatsoever any other person may find to say, what is it that you can find? Such is the language which to any one by whom this theory is maintained every other person that pleases has a right to use and that right an indisputable one.

But what are the propositions for which this theory is needed, and to which the benefit of it is applied? Such propositions and such alone as are in themselves improbable: for as to those such as are probable there is not one of them that has any need of it.
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