JB_806_166.xml

Title: [9 Novr 1811 Evidence (or rather Anti]

Description: 9 Novr 1811

Evidence (or rather Anti [...?] /Jug. false/

1. Theoretic

Ch. Persuasion

§. Reid & Campbel

1

§.3

Since the publication of that work of David Hume another set of philosophers have appeared according to whose belief affirmative persuasion is not an act of the judgement, nor yet the result of a certaindegree of vividness in the idea or image of the supposed matter of fact in question but the result of the operation of a particular sort of sense a sense as much as any of the five senses a sense made for the purpose, and though not one of the five, as true as sense as any of them.

So inadequate will the cause thus assigned be found to be to the effect produced, that unless a slight intimation were given of the necessity by which the demand for this hypothesis was produced, it may be a matter of difficulty to achieve wonder and admiration how it should ever have come into existence.

A certain class of cases had been noted in which the authority of the judgment was found to sit uneasy. A warrant was wanted for bestowing belief upon a class of supposed facts which by the judgment it was apprehended might be were impossible.

JB_806_168.xml

Title: [9 Nov r 1811 Evidence 3]

Description: 9 Nov r 1811

Evidence

3

1. Theoret

Ch Persuasion

§.3 Reid & Campbel

3

Having judgment itself for its opponent this hypothesis could not but find itself labouring under very serious difficulties.

1. Out of two cases, of each of which the existence is equally undividable, for one alone did it so much as take upon itself to give account. For the act of belief as often as examined upon testimony, it provided a believing sense—a testimony-believing sense. But while in some instances testimony is believed in others it is disbelieved: of them to account for belief of testimony there be a need of a believing sense to account for disbelief of testimony there exits not less need of a disbelieving sense.

The believing sense being infallible, how is it with the disbelieving sense? If this be not infallible likewise, [...?] will be expected to account for the difference.

If both be alike infallible, here we every now and then have two senses one pronouncing a fact true, the other pronouncing the same thing not true: each contradicting the other, and both of them infallible.

JB_806_167.xml

Title: [9 Nov r 1811 Evidence 1. Theoretical]

Description: 9 Nov r 1811

Evidence

1. Theoretical

Ch Persuasive Causes

§.3 Reid & Campbel

2

Conformity to the experienced nature of men and things had by other hands been held up to view as the standard of trustworthiness in testimony. If verityon the part of the fact reported be more disconformable to the experienced nature of things, than on the part of the reporting witness or witnesses falshood is to the experienced nature of man, in that case it was said, not belief but disbelief is the proper judgment to be passed—is the sort of judgment required by reason in this case.

But in the case in question what was required and desired was that upon the credit of human testimony delivered by witnesses who were not at hand to be subjected to interrogation belief should be given to facts of which it was the offence[?] not to be conformable to, to be in an [...?] degree disconformable to the experienced nature of things.

Under such circumstances to afford for credence a sufficient warrant, the only resource that seemed to be left was to create a source which, at [...?] partaking of that infallibility which in common intendent has been attributed to the few belonging to the old set, should havesufficient authority to over-rule the judgment and reverse its dictates.