date

27 Aug. 1815 Jug. True Ch.
27 Aug. 1815

Jug. True

Ch. Imperfections

Marks of Verity

7

When the story which a man has to tell is true and by him who tells it known to be so [...?] is the case in an eminent and not to say almost exclusive degree where of that in relation to which he performs the function of narrating witness he was himself at the time in question a percipient witness. Speaking from the memory and not from invention a man speaks freely and boldly; for in so far as his memory is correct, and that which he narrates is neither more nor less than that which that faculty presented him with, he is in no danger of uttering what is false, nor therefore of being seen by others so to have trespassed against the laws of truth. Then this is a safe spot: on which he may expatiate at his ease.

On the other hand, no such sincerity but the opposite characterises the situation of him who has taken a false story to obtain credence for. No time does he see in which he can with full security place the false event or state of things for which it is his object and endeavour to find credence: the place whatever it be in which he would take upon him to place at the time in question his supposed matter of fact may at the time in question for aught he knows by some other portion of matter.

14 or 7

Story true and by reporter known to be so, as when he was percipient witness, speaking not from invention but memory, he speaks freely and boldly: conscious of not uttering falshood, he fears not the being seen to do so. Truth a safe spot, in which he may expatiate at ease.

15 or 8.

Not so he who has a false story to obtain credence for. In no portion of time can he safely place his story: in no portion of space can he safely place the portion of matter which he has to speak of as being in it at that time. At that time the place may have been occupied by some other portion of matter, and proof of this may be obtainable: at that time the portion of matter may have been seen to be in some other place. The man of this circumstance a man [...?] the more of these circumstances done to bring to view which for a false [...?] no man of any [...?] [...?].
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