JB_806_288.xml

Title: [2 Sept 1815 H  Jug True 1]

Description: 2 Sept 1815 H 

Jug True

1

I. Prolegomena

Ch. Credence due

1

§. Miracles Modes of accounting for

Suppose that in any instance that the fact as reported, to be too improbable, too repugnant to the ordinary course of nature to present a just claim to credence, by what supposition shall the existence of it in that respect be accounted for?

1. By the narrator or relator himself whether true or not true in substance and in circumstances the fact not regarded, or meant to be regarded by others as miraculous—as unconformable to the ordinary and experienced course of nature: but regarded and represented as such by the heated imagination of devotees.

2. The occurrence or state of things related, altogether imaginary, and void of foundation in fact.

3. The occurrence or state of things as reported, having a foundation in fact, viz. and that a natural one, but converted into a miracle by the addition madeof imaginary circumstances whether by the narrating historiographer or by the other narrators intervening between his pen and the life of the first narrating witness.

4. The fact as reported altogether real except that instead of being produced by miraculous power on the part of the agent, it was produced by the imagination of a patient, i.e. by his imagining that MS alt. illegible. power to have been possessed and exercised in him by the agent.

1

Miraculous statements modes of accounting for their appearance.

1. The now reputed miracles not meant to be presented as such.

2.

2. The incident fabulous in [...?] void of all foundation in fact.

3

3. The ground of the incident true: but the miraculizing circumstances falshoods added to it by the reporter.

4.

4. The reported matter of fact true: but produced not by the powers of the physicians, but by the imagination of the patient.

JB_806_258.xml

Title: [4 Aug 1815 Jug True Miracles]

Description: 4 Aug 1815

Jug True

Miracles

(3)

 See whether for [...?] to reduce this to a dialogue?

No narrative at all: a [...?], not this.

Instead of the moon substitute a star—and say if in company with a dozen such trustworthy persons you yourself were to behold a star following or going before them wherever they went, just as a lantern with a lighted candle would do if it had a servant to carry it, and with this only difference viz. that it had no person to carry it, and that the elevation it kept to was higher than any person could reach to carry a candle or anything else, in that case would you or would you not believe in the existence of such a star?

To a question to this effect the sort of answer which the nature of the case presents as a proper one and the only proper one has been already given.

But on such an occasion as the present a counterquestion presents itself as not irrelevant or in any other sense improper. Would it be consistent with your notions of divine wisdom (or even with your notions of common human wisdom) that for the purposes of obtaining observance for any prescribed system of conduct, and to that end for producing reliance on any system of eventual threats or promises that God should create a star of that sort, and as soon as such intended effect had been produced, annihilate it. And so on, the same question in relation to all the several narratives so alledged to have been employed.

JB_806_222.xml

Title: [28 Aug 1815 Jug. True I. Prolego]

Description: 28 Aug 1815

Jug. True

I. Prolego

Ch. Imperfections

Mark of Verity

9

On the contrary when the story which a man has to relate is a true one, and whether from the extraordinariness of it backwardness of belief presents itself to him as probable, the greater the degree of backwardness apprehended, the greater will be the exertions made in the hope of surmounting it: for this purpose a cause which by the nature of the case is rendered sufficiently obvious to him—not content with giving this title to credence to the single naked fact which the nature of the case point[s] out as the essential one, he will look out for concomitant unessential and not necessarily, but still however actually concomitant facts, unessential facts which at the time in question were concomitant to the essential case—as many as he can find: and the more of them he can find the firmer the pledge and proof of his veracity—of the correctness and completeness which he will have thus afforded.

(Quere if not inserted in substance above?) This is a pencil note bracketing the following paragrah.

(To have had its train of accompaniments of concomitant of synchronous circumstances all of them as real as itself is the distinguishing property of every real matter of fact real event or state of things: not to have in reality any one such synchronous circumstance of its own—not to have any such so much as in appearance, unless it be by borrowing it from a synchronism of real events is the distinguishing character common to every untimely false reported imaginary event or fictitious state of things.)

18 or 11

A certain story true, and by its extraordinariness, or any other circumstance, backwardness of belief apprehended, the greater the degree apprehended, the greater the exertion to surmount it: thence the more actually concomitant facts be found to have been in existence, essential or inessential, the more he will present to view as having been concomitant to the percipient fact.

19 or 12

To have been encompassed by a circle of real concomitant circumstances is the characteristic of a real fact: not to have had any such accompanying marks in reality, nor in appearance unless borrowed from real facts is common to every untruly reported every imaginary fact.