date

25 Dec 1814 Jug. Util. 9
25 Dec 1814

Jug. Util.

9

3

3. Atheism

Atheism — here indeed, the charge in one respect has a real ground — the matter of fact the averment of which is contained in it may in any case be, and in many instances actually is, true. But in this case supposing the fact true, where is the offence? in what does the malignity —the mischief of it consist? against whom is it committed? Against the Almighty? But by the Almighty in such a case what just cause what cause just or unjust can be found. Does no such almighty person exist? then by the supposition there is no such almighty person to be offended. Does he exist? in the supposition wherein does the offence consist? wherein but in ignorance—sheer ignorance. On this supposition so it is that to this man the almighty has not made himself known. Punish the man or so much as be angry at the man (always supposing the almighty to be susceptible of the species of pain by which the emotion of anger is produced) be angry at a man for not knowing what he has never been taught? as well be angry with him for not having the bulk of a whale or the wings of an eagle. As well might any inhabitant of the interior of New Holland be caught and punished as for treason for not having sworn allegiance to King <.^.^.>.

5.

1. Atheism. Conceditur in this case the charge may very well be not groundless. The fact exists.

But where is the malignity the mischievousness of it? Against whom is it committed? Not a[?]. To whom does it afford cause of anger? Not to God: for it is the result of sheer ignorance. Can God be angry with a man for not having learnt what he has not been taught? As well might a South Wales man be punished for not having seen King George.
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    1.

    Had antipathy for its object the good of mankind and for its guide reason, not against atheism but cacotheism would its force be directed. Not in the quantity of force but in its direction does its beneficentness or mischievousness depend.

    2.

    Effects supposed to be produced by God pernicious—destruction of pleasure is production of pain: better for human happiness he should be considered as non-existing than as existing: or the opposite supposition only is it good for man that he exist.