date

25 Dec 1814 Jug Util 10
25 Dec 1814

Jug Util

10

II. Sub Rev

5

Heresy Heterodoxy

Heresy—heterodoxy heresy schism—In all these cases there does exist it is but too true a real matter of fact—and with it a real offence existing and made manifest. Manifest? but on whose part? On the part of the person, to whom and by these expressions, delinquency is imputed? No: but in the part of him by whom it is imputed: By heresy, in Greek [Greek text] ere it was first applied to the purpose of giving intimation of a species of delinquency nothing more was meant than the making of a choice, making a choice as between one opinion and another. Making a choice not between one opinion and another? (says the alledged delinquent accused with heresy) but in doing so where can be the offence? who is there that is not occupied—continually occupied in the making of such choices? who is there that for two minutes together unless by being asleep can avoid making it? who is there that can avoid making it and live?

Oh, but says the accuser the opinion thus chosen is an opinion opposite different from mine. Here then is the proposition involved—continually and necessarily involved in every such charge. I was a person the differing from whom in opinion on any article and in particular in any article of religion, or in a word in any article whatever, in an offence. <.^.^.>by the two expressions one and the same amount to <.^.^.> is expressed. I am in intention a tyrant in so far as <.^.^.> myself a tyrant: and under my tyranny my <.^.^.> is that all mankind be prostrate. My wish and desire is to render miserable whatsoever person shall in any part presume to give expression to an opinion different from mine.

7.

2. Schism

heterodoxy

heresy: In all these instances an offence indeed has place: but the offender is not he to whom: but he by whom transgression is imputed. Heresy means making a choice—nothing more.

8.

Orthodox. The offence consists in making a wrong choice. i.e. a choice different from mine.

9.

Heterodox. This is as much as to say I am tyrant as much as I can be, and wish to subject to my

tyranny all mankind—rendering miserable all who profess to think differently from me.
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