date

1819 Mar. 10 Jug. Util. Verity
1819 Mar. 10

Jug. Util.

Verity

2

Price and Campbel

II. Campbel

(2)

So much for the Revered D r Price. Now for the Reverend D r Campbel. There we have the South Briton? here we have the North Briton.

Improbability—disconformity to the ordinary course of nature—if that be what you mean by miraculousness—is no ground for disbelief, appears no bar to belief. For the trial of /as between such/ conformity and disconformity is a tedious and precarious process. For distinguishing truth from falshood God has given us an instrument which can never err: at least let the /supposed fact/ miracle be ever so miraculous /extraordinary/, the instrument will serve us at pleasure for proving it to be true. This instrument is a believing

sense. We have one sense for seeing; we have another for believing. If the correctness of our belief depended on the judgment of the judicial faculty yes: then indeed in believing an alledged miracle we might believe erroneously. But it depends upon perception: it depends on sense: we have a sense in purpose: and that sense can not be deceived: at any rate in such a case as that in question, when the difference between eternal torment /bliss/ and eternal bliss /torment/ depends upon belief and disbelief, /deceived/ it will not be deceived.

Alas! alas! belief in act of simple perception, and not of the judgement! that judgment /the judicial faculty/ should be said to have no encrease[?] in it. Marginal note: ‘This too was the notion of David Hume.’ When even in the case of sight, where sense has really so large a share in the business, judgement has also a share, and by /in/ its decisions man is so frequently deceived! /Look to the East/ What is it that terminates the horizon? a mountain says the judgment: the wind shifts, the mountain is blown away: it was nothing but a cloud /the mountain was a cloud.
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    In the case of a judgment, a propensity to pass it would not be regarded as sufficiency to prove it just.

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  • Title: [15 Novr 1813  Omitt this page? 5 Aug 1815]
    Description: 15 Novr 1813  Omitt this page? 5 Aug 1815?

    Antimir Price and Campbel

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     The Case of many witnesses remains to be inserted.

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