JB_807_276.xml

Title: [20 Sept 1811 Jug. Util. B.II]

Description: 20 Sept 1811

Jug. Util.

B.II. Under Revelation

Mischief

Ch.9. 7. Antipathy for unbelief

§.2. Unbelief as contempt.

(2)

1. From all difference of opinion displeasure.

2. In matter of fact if extraordinary, to negative affirmative an object of contempt.

If in the mind /breast/ of any unbeliever there by any such sentiment /affection/ as that of contempt, it is never is it God it is always man, that is the object of it.

On any occasion whatever, in relation to any matter of fact whatever, /or at any rate/ /especially of the fact have any thing extraordinary in it, where by two /when by two persons two opposite sides are taken, in the eyes of the one the affirmative being true in the eyes of the other the negative, of the judgment which pronounces the negative /as/ towards him whose decision is in favour of the affirmative, a sentiment of the nature of contempt, though contempt be too strong a word for it, is a natural not to say a necessary result.

On either side any an erroneous judgement is pro

tanto constitution and evidentiary of, an habitual state of mental weakness. By the weakness by which men are rendered prone to endure belief, & more [...?] is more exposed to deception, to imposture, than by the weakness by which he is disposed to endure disbelief. By /a habit of/ endue belief, a man is in proportion to the strength of it fitted to be made a prey to imposition. By a habit of undue disbelief whatsoever other disadvantageous effects many be attached to it that of being a prey to imposition is not among them. By such a label the tendency is rather to guard here against imposition that to expose him to it.

4.

Object of contempt if any not God but man.

5.

Fact extraordinary to believe of the negative d o of the affirmative as naturally in same degree an object of contempt.

6.

Cause—On either side erroneous judgment is mental weakness.

By affirmative belief a man is more exposed to deception than by negative. By a habit of unbelief of suspicion whatsoever be its bad effect, man is guarded against imposition.

JB_807_279.xml

Title: [21 Sept 1811 Jug Util §.4]

Description: 21 Sept 1811

Jug Util

§.4 +

10

B.II. Under Revelation

Ch.9. Mischief 7 Antipathy for unbelief

1

§.4. Hate Cacotheism not others

(5) (1)

But that, in either case antipathy would be rational, useful, laudable

But against Cacotheism it would be most excusable /desirable/

§.4. Proper object of antipathy, not atheism but cacotheism.

On the ground of religion if antipathy had the good of mankind for its object /end in view/, and at the same time reason for its guide, not against atheism but against cacotheism would the force of it be directed. Considered a means to an end human felicity being that end it is not in the quantity /of the force in question/ of good and evil expected /supposed. to be employed, but to the direction supposed to be given to it, that the nature and character of it in respect of beneficentness /utility/ or mischievousness depends.

So far as the effects in the production of which the power of the being in question is supposed /represented as being/ to be employed are of a pernicious /mischievous/ nature destruction of pleasure is productive of pain, so far it is more conducive to human felicity that he /any such being/ should be considered as non-existing than as existing: it is only in the supposition that /on/ the effects in the production of which his power is represented as being employed there is more of good than of evil, of good as above explained than of evil as above explained, that /a general persuasion/ the belief of his existence is, with reference to human felicity a /result/ /state of things/ in any degree desirable.

[marginal summaries]

1.

Had antipathy for its object the good of mankind and for its guide reason, not against atheism but cacotheism would its force be directed. Not in the quantity of force but in its direction does its beneficentness or mischievousness depend.

2.

Effects supposed to be produced by God pernicious—destruction of pleasure is production of pain: better for human happiness he should be considered as non-existing than as existing: or the opposite supposition only is it good for man that he exist.

JB_806_440.xml

Title: [25 Dec 1814 Jug. Util. 9]

Description: 25 Dec 1814

Jug. Util.

9

3

3. Atheism

Atheism — here indeed, the charge in one respect has a real ground — the matter of fact the averment of which is contained in it may in any case be, and in many instances actually is, true. But in this case supposing the fact true, where is the offence? in what does the malignity —the mischief of it consist? against whom is it committed? Against the Almighty? But by the Almighty in such a case what just cause what cause just or unjust can be found. Does no such almighty person exist? then by the supposition there is no such almighty person to be offended. Does he exist? in the supposition wherein does the offence consist? wherein but in ignorance—sheer ignorance. On this supposition so it is that to this man the almighty has not made himself known. Punish the man or so much as be angry at the man (always supposing the almighty to be susceptible of the species of pain by which the emotion of anger is produced) be angry at a man for not knowing what he has never been taught? as well be angry with him for not having the bulk of a whale or the wings of an eagle. As well might any inhabitant of the interior of New Holland be caught and punished as for treason for not having sworn allegiance to King <.^.^.>.

5.

1. Atheism. Conceditur in this case the charge may very well be not groundless. The fact exists.

But where is the malignity the mischievousness of it? Against whom is it committed? Not a[?]. To whom does it afford cause of anger? Not to God: for it is the result of sheer ignorance. Can God be angry with a man for not having learnt what he has not been taught? As well might a South Wales man be punished for not having seen King George.