date

20 Sept 1811 Jug. Util. B.II
20 Sept 1811

Jug. Util.

B.II. Under Revelation

Mischief

Ch.9. 7. Antipathy for unbelief

§.2. Unbelief as contempt.

(2)

1. From all difference of opinion displeasure.

2. In matter of fact if extraordinary, to negative affirmative an object of contempt.

If in the mind /breast/ of any unbeliever there by any such sentiment /affection/ as that of contempt, it is never is it God it is always man, that is the object of it.

On any occasion whatever, in relation to any matter of fact whatever, /or at any rate/ /especially of the fact have any thing extraordinary in it, where by two /when by two persons two opposite sides are taken, in the eyes of the one the affirmative being true in the eyes of the other the negative, of the judgment which pronounces the negative /as/ towards him whose decision is in favour of the affirmative, a sentiment of the nature of contempt, though contempt be too strong a word for it, is a natural not to say a necessary result.

On either side any an erroneous judgement is pro

tanto constitution and evidentiary of, an habitual state of mental weakness. By the weakness by which men are rendered prone to endure belief, & more [...?] is more exposed to deception, to imposture, than by the weakness by which he is disposed to endure disbelief. By /a habit of/ endue belief, a man is in proportion to the strength of it fitted to be made a prey to imposition. By a habit of undue disbelief whatsoever other disadvantageous effects many be attached to it that of being a prey to imposition is not among them. By such a label the tendency is rather to guard here against imposition that to expose him to it.

4.

Object of contempt if any not God but man.

5.

Fact extraordinary to believe of the negative d o of the affirmative as naturally in same degree an object of contempt.

6.

Cause—On either side erroneous judgment is mental weakness.

By affirmative belief a man is more exposed to deception than by negative. By a habit of unbelief of suspicion whatsoever be its bad effect, man is guarded against imposition.
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  • Title: [20 Sept 1811 Jug Util §.2.]
    Description: 20 Sept 1811

    Jug Util

    §.2.

    B.II. Under Revelation

    Mischief 7.

    Ch.9. Antipathy for unbelief

    §.2. Mischief no contempt not even Atheism.

    To present Atheism idiots should be allowed.

    5. Well therefore might he say I came not to bring peace but the sword

    6. Non sequitor, even in physical principle, that because such a proposition is true, it is wicked not to believe it.

    §.2. Erroneous conception exasporative of this antipathy—notion of contempt to God as if attached to unbelief or misbelief.

    Ask for the cause of all this hatred, the cause or remedy, and that cause of course a reason, a justification, the fullest of justifications.

    God hath delivered /this/ his word: these infidels will not take /[...?]/ his word: /God, if you believe them, is/ They charge God with being a liar. O horrid blasphemy!

    God hath delivered these his commands. These men refuse to obey his commands. Oh mad rebellion /contumers/ God to man an object of contempt! /Omnipotence to human imbecility./

    Never was charge more compleatly groundless. In no mans heart in no mans life was God was a liar.

    To no man, man or woman was God ever, or can God ever be an object of contempt.

    By the Atheist God is no more an object of contempt than to the most jealous theist.

    The question take it /on/ in what shape /occasion/ you will is no mere question of judication of inference drawn from evidence. A matter of fact is always in question: in relation to it, /in the eyes of those on one side/ in the one part the affirmative is true: in those of the other, the negative.

    1.

    Justificative cause assigned for antipathy on the score of unbelief—contempt and disobedience: God’s veracity denied, his will destroyed.

    2.

    The imputations are groundless.

    Not true, that by any man God was ever deemed a liar.

    Not true, that to any man he ever was an object of contempt.

    To the Atheist not more so than to the Theist.

    3.

    The question is one of evidence—to some the affirmative is true, to others the negative.
  • Title: [11 Feb 1813 p.1. Part 2. + 30 Church]
    Description: 11 Feb 1813 p.1. Part 2. + 30

    Church U.C.

    1 p.1.

    Part 2.

    Persuasion affirmation belief - belief

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    § 1.

    Part 2. Persuasion - belief - disbelief: - faulting its intensity - how measured

    1

    Subject of persuasion

    fact or proposition

    The subject of persuasion is either this or that some

    supposed matter of fact itself, or a proposition i.e. a form of words concerning some such matter of fact

    bearing relation to and predicating existence or non-existence

    to some such matter of fact.

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    Persuasion what

    its subject 1. a fact

    2. a proposition. (a)

    By persuasion seems to be universally understood

    an act of judgment — of the judicial faculty

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    deemed to exist or not deemed to exist, or some proposition relative

    to some matter of fact is deemed to be true or [deemed]

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    (a) Add Not to say that a

    matter of fact if continually

    to demand

    and vice versa

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    interconvertibility

    Where, as above, the decision of the judgment is on the positive or say

    the affirmative side, belief is the word most commonly employed

    the word persuasion has most commonly for its

    synonym the word belief; - where on the negative side,

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    being synonymous to disbelief of the corresponding affirmative

    proposition, and disbelief of a negative synonymous to

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  • Title: [9 Nov r 1811 Evidence 1 Theoretic]
    Description: 9 Nov r 1811

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    According to David Hume alone of any supposed matter of fact the idea which his plan in a mans mind is to a certain degree vivid, the supposed matter of fact is by that same man believed: if the vividness has not risen to that necessary degree, the matter of fact is not believed, belief in regard to it has no place.

    On this occasion the state of the mind called disbelief seems scarcely to have presented itself to his notice: by the affirmative phases of persuasion viz the opposite case belief his attention seems to have been engrossed. Had the two equally existing modes of persuasion obtained each of them that equal/share of attention which was its due, the need of looking out for some common term, equally applicable to both, such as the word persuasion would naturally have presented itself to so acute a mind.

    In respect of conception or memory or both degree of vividness the sole difference between belief and disbelief or rather between belief and un-belief. Such was Humes theory. How stands the matter of fact, as testified by memorial[?] experience? an experience to which hurried away by the warmth of the philosophical pursuit his attention could never find the opportunity for applying itself.