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21 Sept 1811
Jug. Util.
11
B.II
Ch.9.7 Antipathy from mischief
2
§.4. Hate cacotheism not atheism
(2)
1. —sensible man
With the character of a being of an ordinary degree of benevolence of a being whose benevolence went not beyond that degree which is expressed /in the case of a human being/ by the denomination of a good- natured man, the supposition of any such emotion as that of anger /wrath/ of any such disposition as that of reflecting pain in the character of punishment, would in either case /both cases/ be inconsistent and /on the part of one and the same person/ self-contradictory.
With the character of a being endowed with an ordinary degree of wisdom—of a being whose wisdom went not beyond that degree which in the cast of a human being is exposed by the denomination of a sensible man, the supposition of any such opinion as that /by/ /the entertaining/ notion of either kind the character given to him who entertained it was whether the notion was well or ill-grounded that of an immoral man would in both cases be inconsistent and self contradictory, as above.
But if by /the contemplation of/ any such fact as that of an erroneous opinion, entertained of his character by a /concerning his character or his existence by a/ being no wish to be capable of exercising in /the/ his happiness any prejudicial influence, any such existence as that of anger were in the bosom either of a good natured man or a sensible man capable of being existed, a worm for instance, an oyster or a person, by which /in the case of/ of two worms would /any such/ that motive be raised to the highest pitch by the worm by which his existence with all qualities good and bad together belonging to it /had been/ seen. Denied or doubted of a demand, or by the worm by which his existence being affirmed, the idea of the quality of malevolence and maleficence were /a persuasion/ an idea compleatly attached to that of his existence?
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To a goodnatured man no displeasure would be excited by the knowledge of there being this or that person by whom his existence was not believed.
4.
By no sensible man (if exempt from terrors) would the motive be entertained that in such non-belief if sincere there was any thing unmoral.
5.
If in the goodnatured or sensible breast anger could be excited by an error entertained by a worm as to his character or existence, by production of malevolence the anger would be more exacting than by denial of existence.
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