1821. April 17.

First Lines

Penal Law

Case 2. Where it is needless. Here the circumstance by /from/ which the evil receives the denomination of punishment viz. misdoing, misdeed offence has place: as such, evil is among the consequences of it. But, by the operation of some other cause, all the relative good that could be done by the evil of punishment, is done without it. In this case, therefore, whatsoever portion of punishment wee applied would be all loss.

Case 3. Where it would be inefficacious. In this case, too, it would be the evil of the offence ever so great, the evil of punishment, though it could not be said to be needless, would however be all loss: to the undiminished evil of the offence would be added the evil of the punishment.

Case 4. Where the punishment would be unprofitable.

Of the evil which, in its totality, would otherwise be produced by the offence, a portion, more or less considerable, would be excluded by the punishment. But the evil thus introduced is greater than the evil excluded by it.

In the three former cases, the evil of the punishment is all loss: in this last case, the evil produced is not all loss, but, after deducting from the sum of what is produced by it, the sum of what is excluded by it, there still remains as a /on the/ balance a net remainder or difference which is so much loss.

Comprehensive and on that account theoretical as the description of these cases may appear, there is not one of them that has not, hitherto to a vast and deplorable extent, had its exemplification in practice. To bring to view /afford/ an indication of every one of them, would be to give an all-comprehensive picture of whatever has been hitherto done on the field of penal law. For the clearer conception of each, all that can here be done is - to afford a simple indication of a few comparatively particular but still too comprehensive examples.