[xxxviii. 23]

1822 July 15

Constitut. Code Rationale

Securities

5 Moral Counterforce

Public Opinion Tribunal

A few articles

Exposition and Rationale

15. II. Representative Democracy. Here, without difficulty legal responsibility, universal, may have place. During office, no: not the whole nor a majority: to say yes would be self contradictory. But during office the minority: after office all may be punishable: just as every one else is: for misdeeds there as elsewhere. See accordingly articles,│   │

16. Moral responsibility. This is to the purpose of eventual exposure to punishment by the │   │ of the popular or moral sanction at the hands of Public opinion Tribunal: (viz. the democratical section of it. Quere this here) like the │   │ invisible, but not the less operative.

17. To punishment such as is inflictible by this Tribunal, not only in a Representative Democracy, but even in an absolute Monarchy, may the possessors of the supreme operative stand excluded/posed/.

18. In this sense and shape even in an absolute Monarchy, even the Monarch feels himself responsible: though to the purpose of mitigation, of Monarch's oppression and depredation subject's sufferings, the effect is hardly perceptible.

19. Counterforce beneficial the less the legal, the greater the need of moral. In Monarchy, legal none, thence of the moral, need a maximum: actual quantity a minimum. Cause, the security afforded by the moral against the sinister sacrifice.

(Insert note on the toleration in Tuscany and Russia.)

20. Contrast. In Representative Democracy, legal counterforce compleatly effective: need of the moral, for this purpose, a minimum: actual quantity a maximum.

21 Ao. 1803. In a season of insufficient experience, partly on account of the annoyance to individuals, supreme operatives deprived the community of this security. But greatest happiness etc. being the end, and by all seen to be so, it was restored by lapse of time, and is now fixt for as long as the democracy lasts.