29 Aug 1804

Evidence

Circumstantial

Ch.1.

§.1.

Circumstantial

force

Throughout the present book, either human testimony will not have come in question at all, or the trustworthiness of it, or at least the propriety of admitting it, for the purpose of inquiry, will have been assumed: the topics of trustworthiness and admissibility being reserved for separate consideration in their respective places. The relations here upon the carpet will accordingly be not the relation between fact and human testimony affirming the existence or non-existence of such fact - but between a fact supposed to be proved (an evidentary fact), and another fact (the principal fact) considered as capable of being proved or disproved by such evidentary fact: not the relation between the existence of testimony, and the existence of a fact of another sort - the fact affirmed or disaffirmed by such testimony; but the relation between one fact and another fact: between a fact the existence of which is supposed to be established by human testimony or otherwise, and another fact the existence of which is considered as being proved or disproved by it.

We shall not therefore in the whole course of this book, be embarrassed by /with/ any of those doubts and difficulties which hover over the field of human testimony. For the purpose of the enquiry, the existence of the evidentary fact will be supposed to be established, no matter how: and the /our/ consideration will be confined to the connection between that fact and the principal fact, to the proof or disproof of which it is considered as applicable. The greater[?] the subject of the question /All along the subject of consideration/ is - not the truth of the evidentary fact - but the nature and strength of the connection or relation between that and the other fact - the principal fact.

 Under the heads of false responsion, false suggestion we show that this is true even in those instances.