27 Aug 1804

Evidence

Circumstantial

Ch.2

§.1. [...?] [...?]

It is among the properties of psychological facts, as such not to be made /make themselves/ known, evidenced, but through /otherwise than/ through the medium of some physical fact. What I myself /you yourself/ intend - what I am /you are/ conscious of - by what motives my intention has on this or that occasion been produced - all these facts, being facts the existence of which is confined within my own breast, can not in the way of immediate perception be known to anybody but myself: if /to you/ they are made known to you in any way, it can only be by means of some physical fact or facts, the perception of which has made its way into your mind through the medium of some one or more of your corporal[?] senses.

Such then is the importance of circumstantial evidence. In the most important class of cases it is so necessary /indispensable/, that without it all the direct evidence imaginable would be unavailing. In vain would it be ascertained /established/ that the hand of Titius had given motion to the hatchet from whence Sempronius[?] received his death, unless it were also ascertained, that death or at least the affliction /wound/ [...?] had been the object of the will - of the intention of Titius - had been the effect or among the effects intended by Titius to be produced. In vain would it be established that Titius mounted and rode off with the horse, to which the property he had no good title[?]; in vain unless it were also ascertained that at the time of his so doing, he was conscious of having no right - no good title so to do. The offence of Titus would not in murder in the one case: it would not be theft, stealing, larceny, in the other.