16 Sept 1804

Evidence

Circumstantial

Ch. [...?] [...?] [...?]

§ 1. Generalis[?]

Ch. Probative force of the several species /above modifications/ of circumstantial evidence - causes of its failure.

Take on the one part any given principal fact; on the other, any given evidentiary fact, being such with reference to the above principal fact: and let the existence of the evidentiary fact be supposed to be certain - admitted as such on all hands. To whomsoever it appears that such is the strength /probative force/ of the connection between the two in this case no /no/ [...?] of things can take a place in which the principal fact shall not have happened, to him the probative force of the evidentiary fact must /can not but/ appear conclusive.

To whomsoever it appears that in the same case this or that fact may have existed /had existence/, the existence of which being supposed the principal fact may not have happened, to him the probative force of the evidentiary fact must appear short of conclusive

The deficiency in point of conclusiveness will appear greater and greater, the greater the probability of such collateral and hypothetical infirmative fact: and suppose a number of these hypothetical facts, the probability of each being the same the above deficiency will be greater and greater, in proportion as the number of such infirmative facts is greater: - all these separate /several/ infirmative facts will form an aggregate /a sort of complex/ infirmative fact the infirmative force of which will be as the number of the elementary or compound infirmative facts. In like manner by the ordinary mathematical methods, if the probability of each such elementary infirmative fact were given, although in the case of each it were different in the case of each, the aggregate infirmative force of the aggregate infirmation fact might be obtained.