28 July 1805

Evidence

Introd. Jurisprud

Ch. II. Vices

From all that has been seen, of [...?] of one proposition seems sufficiently /tolerably/ clear,: that uncertainty is of /essential/the very essence of jurisprudential law.

That this uncertainty indeed admits of degrees, correspondent to the different classes of persons with relation to whom /in whose minds/ the uncertainty is considered as subsisting: viz: 1. non-lawyers: 2. attorneys, 3. advocates, in their character of opinionists, not to speak of Judges.

That be the answer what it may, how certain and clear what soever the answer to it may appear to be in the eyes of the advocate /opinionist/, or even the attorney, this relative and [...?] /imperfect/ degree of certainty will not be sufficient to divest it of the character of uncertainty with relation to the individual whose conduct is expected in reality or in pretence to be governed by it, and whose fate is made at any rate to depend upon it.

That the species or degree of uncertainty being of the essence of jurisprudential law, and not being of the essence of statutory law, constitutes a /the/ characteristic difference between the two species or forms of law.

Not, that even statutory law is essentially altogether exempt from the imputation of uncertainty. Every discourse is liable to be mis-expressed: every discourse, well or ill-expressed, is liable to be misconceived: and statutory law is a discourse. But as in what concerns the mode of exposition in the case of statutory law the mishap /inconvenience/ is but accidental and comparatively rare /and as the powers /faculties/ of the human mind gain strength by exercise is in a way to be every day less and less rare:/ in the case of jurisprudential law it is constant /essential/ and incurable. If Since as hath so often been observed, it is of the essence of jurisprudential law to have no tenor at all, no form and no collection of words, in to which the quality certainty can adhere /inhere/.