14 May 1805

Evidence

Introd

Ch 9. Precipitation

Compared with delay, its seeming antagonist /opposite/ /correlative/ precipitation, will be found altogether disparate and anomalous. Besides the effects, it agrees not with it so much as in respect of the persons chargeable as authors. Delay, unnecessary or preponderant delay, is at least as liable to be the act and fault of the party, as of the Judge. Precipitation, considered as a fault by /an act from/ which any person other than the agent is liable /exposed/ to suffer injury, can not be the act of any person but the Judge or his subordinates. By precipitation, if the conduct of either party is chargeable with it, it is the precipitate party himself that suffers by it, not his adversary, unless it be by the default /by the fault/ of the Judge.

Precipitation then, supposing it to take place, is peculiarly /more particularly/ if not exclusively the fault of the Judge: and when it does take place, of what nature is the mischief caused by it? It is the mischief of misdecision - the ultimate collateral evil incident to procedure - in one or other of its three branches: administration of punishment where undue, collation of rights (thence imposition of corresponding obligations) where undue administration of satisfaction, (with its correspondent obligations) where undue.

But, through the medium of precipitation may it not happen to the Judge to produce unnecessary or preponderant vexation? - Yes: - or expence? Yes: - yes - and even delay. But in each of these cases whatever may be the mischief produced, it is the mischief of vexation, the mischief of expence, or the mischief of delay: distinct from /over and above/ those mischiefs respectively, precipitation, is not productive of any sort of mischief.