23 April 1805

Evidence

Ends

Ch Conflict

'.1 Conflict

 Alter from the marginal contents

But though for the purpose of preventing /in every case/ the existence of delay vexation and expence incident to litigation in every case, the determination to take away in every case all recourse to justice /the judicial power/ would be thus absurd and ruinous, yet the opposite determination directly opposite viz: to carry on the recourse of justice - to bring about in every individual case and in every individual part, the fulfilment of the several articles of the substantive branch of the law without any regard to the quantum of collateral inconvenience, in the shape of delay, vexation and expence, would not be much less so. The mischief attached to the non-fulfilment of the arrangements taken and predictions delivered by the substantive branch of the law is variable upon a scale at both ends little short of infinite - is susceptible of an almost infinite number of degrees: the mischief liable to be produced by juridical delay vexation and expence is also variable upon a scale of prodigious /vast/ extent, though not quite so nearly approaching to infinity as in the former /preceding/ case. Under these circumstances it must every now and then happen[?] that in this or that individual case, the mischief resulting from the aggregate mass of collateral inconvenience, or even from a single one of its three /those its/ branches will be superior, and that beyond dispute to the good resulting from the pursuit of the main end - to the mischief resulting from /attached to/ the abandonment of it.