12 April 1803

Evidence

Ends

Ch.

' Precipitation

Suppose the precipitation to exist in the highest degree possible. Suppose a decision meant to be an ultimate one given by a Judge at the very commencement of the cause - no proof received: no argument heard: decision given in favour of the plaintiff or in favour of the defendant, at the first word.

Note

If in favour of the plaintiff in the penal branch it will be punishment administered, or satisfaction administered, or both according to the nature of the offence; if in the non-penal branch, the demanded right conferred: if in favour of the defendant, in the penal branch the defendant will have been declared (not guilty consequently) not subjectable to the punishment required not bound to afford the satisfaction demanded; if in the non-penal branch not subjectable to the obligation necessary to the collation of the demanded right.

The decision thus given at the very commencement of the cause - thus given by precipitation, and for want of the allowance of the portion of time requisite for the affording room for reception of the requisite evidence, arguments, and steps - may be no other than the very decision which would have been given had the utmost portion of time been allowed that the nature of the cause required - had there been no precipitation in the case. Such might have been the result: and abstraction made of the particular nature of the cause, it is just as probable as the other. The cause, supposing it a simple one, has but two sides that of the plaintiff and that of the defendant; the right side and the wrong one. If the decision be determined by cross[?] and file, the chances are as many in favour of his deciding in favour of the same side in consequence of the precipitation as that in which he would have decided without any precipitation, as there are in favour of his deciding on the different side.