1819 July 31

Defence of Ballot &c Disfranchisement

2. Transference to populous towns

3

pauperism or in contemplation/under any apprehension/ of becoming so would of course be subject on this as on other points be subjected: to the dominion of their respective employers, whether Magistrates or not would be subjected the votes of all such Electors as were respectively dependent for their employment, on such persons as at the time were their employers.

Universal suffrage however is indeed a principle which one may be perfectly assured would not even on so small and inefficient /inadequate/ a scale be adopted. Still however {the number of} those to whose votes while given in the open mode a direction adverse to the universal interest would be given either by sinister interest or by misjudgment would be but too likely to be in such numbers as to determine the Election: and suppose this the case, though in this shape no evil so neither would any good be produced by the transference. On the other side of the account of profit and loss would stand the collateral Election evils: consisting in this case chiefly in the danger of violence and injury to person and property: but these may be considered as sufficiently counteracted by the additional opportunities of appropriate instruction afforded to the lower orders.

If the effect of it were in any degree to operate in the character of an obstacle to radical and /or other/ efficient reform, here would be a serious evil attached to it. But no evil in this shape presents itself as attached to it. Yes, if of the Members elected upon this partial plan the seats would be endangered by a plan of all-comprehensive reform. But this would not be the case: for upon the plan of radical and all-comprehensive reform the number of seats belonging to the most populous towns would not be less than upon the plan here in question but greater.