[131a-011]

1818 March 22 +

Parl Reform Answer to Antiballotists

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But this insincerity, such as it has been /is/ shewn to be, the argument assumes that it will be habitually committed. If I do not misconcur[?] the matter habitually is here put for extensively. By it is meant – not, or not merely, that the insincerity will be frequently committed by the same person, but that, with more or less frequency, it will be committed by each one of a great number of persons. For this sense, it seems to me it is, that the train of the argument requires.

Now, will it be committed thus extensively? No: in my view of the matter { that} it will not. It will not be committed, to an extent, approaching to any thing like equality, to that to which as above it would be committed under the open mode.

In regard to the extent, note this much in the first place. The insincerity can not have place – for there will be no motive for it – any further than the law proves inefficacious: – the law, which, by the supposition, will have for its object, and sole object, the prevention of the combination of tyranny, servility, and imposture as above described.

Now it does not appear to me, that a law for this purpose, framed as I should propose to frame it, would be in any danger of proving inefficacious.

The insincerity can not have place, but in so far as there exists a human tyrant, or would-be tyrant, of whom it is known, that, having it in his power to do evil to the voter for the purpose of compelling the voter to practice the imposture in question, he is prepared and determined, in the event of the voters not practising it,, to do to him such evil accordingly: in the event of the voters not practicing it: – add – and being, by the tyrant known not to have practised it: for unless either this is known, or he punishes without knowing why, no motive will he have for punishing.