1822 Sept. 28 Tripoli. Securities against Misrule

In the case of a Charter, if it be regarded as really obligatory, there is but

one party on whom any obligation attaches: in the case of a Contract, there are

two parties: the people forming one of them. If then the Contract form be the

form employed, consistency would seem to require that there should on the

occasion of the solemnity by /from/ which it appears to derive its sanction,

there should be something done by and on the part of the people:- thanks to the

Sovereign for his entering into his part in it - thanks with acclamations:-

Thanks the Sovereign,- to God - to the Prophet - to every body - nothing of this

sort need be grudged. But on their part, if any thing, what more can be done

with safety and advantage? Promise to obey him and all his descendants to the

end of time? this would be too much: too much even although on the part of those

potentates the condition of their performing their part of the Contract were

attached to the promise on the part of the people. For - what if another form of

government should come to be regarded as in a greater degree contributory to the

greatest happiness of the greatest number? Promise to obey his descendants so

long as the Contract were on their part kept inviolate, and so long as Monarchy

continued to be the form of government? This is exactly what seems desirable:

but unfortunately, the more desirable on the one part, the less likely to be

acceded to on the other.

In the case of England, the Whig Monarchists who brought about the Revolution in

the time of James 2d saw the advantage attached as above to the Contract form;

and in their arguments, employed it accordingly. Their contract however - the

Original contract they called it - a mere fiction: and of its being a mere

fiction an evil consequence was - that, on each occasion, the terms of it

remaining to be feigned, they made them whatsoever seemed to them most

advantageous to their own particular interests. But, in the case here in

question, there would be no fiction, and there being two contracting parties to

this contract, the terms of it might, by mutual consent of both parties, be

changed at any time. So long as the terms were kept by the Monarch, the people

would not be likely to feel much inclination to change: but, supposing them at

any time infringed by him, it would be for them to make themselves amends, and

provide for that purpose whatsoever security seemed to them most efficient: for

example the change from the mixt Monarchy to a Representative Democracy: and for

the bringing about such change, the Constitution here in question would prepare

them, by giving them power in every shape: