[xxxiv. 297]

1824. Feb y. 27

Constitutional Code. For Greece

Ch. Sub-Legislatures

?. Observations

Federative System

3. The inconveniences from the want of a stronger bond of connection than the original one which was little more than that of an ordinary alliance were all along felt. By this feeling was at length produced the existing federative Constitution by which while to some purposes and in some points of the field of legislation they were united to other purposes, and on other points they were continued in a state of separation.

4. In that instance, in the case of a simple form of government the immense distance between some parts of the union and others would probably /might perhaps/ of itself be found an insuperable bar to good government, and though the complication and uncertainty inseparable from the demarcation of logical fields of service can not but have been productive of inconvenience to an amount more or less considerable, yet the good sense with which those lines of demarcation have been drawn, joined to the sense of the necessity of mutual forbearance have hitherto continued and in that instance may not improbably for ever continue to preserve the inconvenience from settling[?] to any serious magnitude

Very different in these points is the case of Greece:

1. In Greece no such formed habits of separate settled rule have place as yet, in any determinate number of breasts in any of the several portions of territory among which the union will have to be formed.

2. In Greece compared with the American territory in question the distance between the remotest portions that can be [...?] to join in the union is inconsiderable