15 March 1808

Injustice is an appellative, the application of which is not confined to either side. But, in practice, the application of it does not seem alike divided and determinate in regard to every one of the nine articles contained in the above list of evils correspondent and opposite to the so often mentioned ends.

In the case of those evils the seat of which is confined to the defendant's side, there is no room for doubt. That to the prejudice of him on whom undue obligations are imposed, in whatsoever nature those obligations may be, and on whatsoever score imposed, viz. punishment (the punishment being undue) satisfaction, as for wrong unduly administered to the benefit of a party stationed on the plaintiff's side, or unduly made collation of rights in favour of a party on that same side - but in any of these uses injustice has place as often as to the prejudice of an individual on the defendant's side undue obligations are imposed, are propositions the propriety of which does seem in any degree exposed to dispute.

In the same case seems to be the propriety of the appellation when applied to two at least of the three evils correspondent and opposite to the nine direct ends of judicature: viz. non-administration of satisfaction when due, and non-collation of rights when due.