12 June 1807

(13) (1)

Letter V

II. Litigation

Concluding Observations?

After this the observation showing that Judge and C o could not have been safely corrupt to more advantage.

They are not [...?] /[...?] [...?]/ to the dishonest suitor[?] the certainty of [...?] for ever, as we[?] shall see them [...?] the certainty of doing so far on [...?] his years, in safety and therefore without remorse - without shame

The nature and mode of operation of the several instruments considered, it will be evident that it was not in every instance in the power of the conductors of the system to promote the design of it in one way without counter acting it in another.

1. In the case of bonâ fide causes, so far as the uncertainty respecting the disposition of the main body of the law, so far as it was rendered matter of doubt whether the plaintiff had or had not under the law a title to the service which in point of natural justice at least be looked upon as his due - this uncertainty which it might tend in the way of encouragment to engage the party at whose charge the service was demanded, to refuse it, and so become defendant, would tend on the other side, in virtue of the difference in point of apparent probability, to discourage and deter him who should have been plaintiff from taking upon him that function: and as in regard to delay, vexation and expence.

But in respect of the prospect of ultimate success in bonâ fide suits this is all that could safely be done for the promotion of unintentional wrongs and litigation: and again in such malâ fide suits in which the malâ fides is on the defendant's side, this is all that could with like safety be done for the promotion of dishonesty, intentional wrongs, and litigation malâ fide on that side: a certainty of ultimate success in every case in favour of every individual who, whether in the right or in the wrong, and indiscrimately in the station of plaintiff or that of defendant at pleasure, would at the price of the attendant expence and delay be content to purchase it, and that without exposing the Judge to danger in any shape whether in the shape of legal or moral censure, was found to exceed the power of the mot consummate astutia on the part of the Judge, even when seconded by the most consummate blindness or patience on the part of sovereign and people.