[094-468v]

6 March 1808

on L d Eldon's Bill

Note

Letter V

'.3. Reasons

Ends of Justice

Table of the Ends of Justice, /being the/ or legitimate and proper highest ends of judicature: to the attainment of which in the possible degree of perfection, the proceedings of all judicatories ought to be continually directed

1. Ends of the first Order: being the pursuit of which is prescribed by consideration of immediate /direct/ utility - utility not depending on the subservience of these to any other ends.

Postpone

The pursuit of these ends falls /lies/ within the competence /functions/ of judicatories of all stages. vis. as well appellate /of appellate jurisdiction/ (in any numbers above another, as if immediate:

1. End the 1 st. the direct ends of justice.

1. Direct end. Positive denomination Rectitude of decision. viz. in the case where the decision, any /a/ right decision, will operate in favour of the plaintiff's side of the cause.

Negative denomination avoidance of misdecision. to the prejudice of the plaintiff's side: misdecision to the prejudice of the plaintiff's Side is the evil correspondent and opposite to this first and direct end of justice.

That part of the body of the law /whole body of the law/ - the hour[?] of which constitutes to this purpose the standard of rectitude as the reason or substantive branch: the branch with which /reference to/ the system of judicial procedure is the adjective branch. So far as the rule of action has been invested with the form of real law, i.e. statutory sanctions /(improperly/ called written) law, it is of the text of the real law that the standard of rectitude is /what must to this purpose be considered as/ all along composed. Where it /the rule of action as yet/ remains in the form of imaginary law viz. jurisprudential improperly called unwritten and uncharacteristically called common law, law which not having any determinate assemblage of words belonging to it, has therefore no other than an imaginary and fictitious existence, the standard of rectitude is of course /necessarily/ imaginary: it is composed of the supposed purport of a set of regulations which in fact have, never been made. In this case, these[?] being no real standard of rectitude, neither rectitude of decision nor misdecision, can in strictness of speech be said to have place.