1818 Aug. 25

Government

Things as they are: or First lines &c.

§.1. Misrule Necessity

6

6

9. In /Under/ a democracy whether self ruling or representative, self-regarding interest will in like manner be in every breast predominant. It will therefore be so in the breast of every member of the representative body. On such occasions Every such member would if he could sacrifice to his own personal interest the interest of the whole people. Without the concurrence of a majority of that whole body no such member can make any such sacrifice /as such can do that or any thing else/. If a majority could agree and continue long enough in such their trust they would act as an aristocracy, they would sacrifice the interest of the rest of the people to that interest which they have in common. But, by the supposition, acting on this ocasion they can not continue long enough in such their trust /situation/. For power on one part exerts not but in proportion to obedience /obsequiousness/ on the other. What the people are disposed to is to pay obedience /shew obsequiousness/ to the objects of their confidence, so long as but no longer than, they are regarded by them as abstaining from those acts by which the interest of the people is /would be/ sacrificed to the interests of all or any of these their delegates and so long as they continue so, their rulers. In the event of his concurring in the endeavour to make any such sacrifice, that which no such representative sees before him is any tolerable /considerable/ chance of success: that which every one sees before him is a certainty of dismission which is itself a punishment, coupled with a chance more or less considerable of ulterior punishment.

Under a Monarchy no such unpleasant chance does the Monarch see: under an Aristocracy no such unpleasnt chance does any member of the Aristocracy see.

A representative democracy is therefore not a government of misrule: and it is the only one that is not so. it is in its essence a good government; and the only one that is so.