1818 Sept. 29.

Parl. Reform Bill

VII or VIII

Reasons 3 o

'.2 Electors Who

Universality

1. Probity

16

32. In the situation of Elector having a vote in the election of a democratical assembly of Representatives chosen and seated upon the principle of virtually universal suffrage there will in like manner be in the breast of every Member a constant and continually predominant propensity to sacrifice to the self-regarding interest of the individual, and thence to the collective interest of the Assembly /whole body/, social interest in the largest scale.

33 Observe now in these several situations, respectively observe now what there is, if any thing by which this sacrifice can be opposed.

In the situation of Monarch there is {nothing to oppose the sacrifice,} absolutely nothing.

34 In the situation of Member of an Aristocratical governing body there is absolutely nothing {to oppose this sacrifice}

35 In the situation of Member of a Democratical assembly of Representatives chosen as above upon the principle /under the system/ of virtually universal suffrage, there exists a check /curb/ to this propensity, and such a check as affords every promise of being /is capable of being rendered /belonging// compleatly effectual. /for the most part an effectual one./ This is the fear of being removed /displaced/ out of that same situation and that by /the operation/ so simple a cause as the negative circumstance /incident/ of the act being realized at the next Election, provided it be to a certain degree a speedily-recurring one.

36 In the situation of an Elector acting as above upon the principle of virtually universal suffrage there will in like measure be as above the propensity mentioned above. To This propensity no such check stands opposed as stands opposed to the like propensity in the case of the Representative: because /for/ the Elector is under /subject to/ no apprehension of being displaced.