[clx. 381]

1822 July 21

Constitut Code Rationale

Public Opinion

Aristocratical faction

In the case of the Public-Opinion Tribunal duty and interest can never fail to coincide: the line of action /practice/ pointed out by duty can never fail to coincide with the line of practice pointed out by interest. It is the interest of the greatest number that the greatest happiness of the greatest number be on every occasion the object taken by the government as its end in view - the end to the fulfilment of which its practice shall /is/ on every occasion be directed. Such is the interest of the greatest number: and as to the word duty if on this occasion there be any use in the employing of it, scarce will any man venture to say of the same greatest number that their duty is in any respect opposite or different.

At the time when this distinction first presented itself an idea which at the same time presented itself in the character of a necessary consequence was that of a Judicatory divided into two Sections: two Sections equally legitimate as in the case of the French Parliaments if divided, each of them under the qoundam regimes into several Chambers one of them distinguished by the name /title/ of Grand: and as in the case of the Supreme Judicatory of Scotland divided by an arrangement of recent date divided into two Chambers both sitting at the same time. To one of these supposed Sections was thereupon attached the appellation of the Democratical Section, to the other that of the Aristocratical Section: and at the same time such was the force of habit and prejudice, the Aristocratical was that to which in the order of designation was given the precedence.

On a closer consideration the observation was made the idea /conception/ suggested by this nomenclature was found /seen/ to be deceptious and delusive. For in the conception thus suggested was included that of an equality of regard as being due to the aristocratical as compared with the democratical: a conception which on the supposition of an oppositeness in the interest of the few to the interest of the many could /can/ not be reconcileable to truth