[clxvii. 249]

1820. Aug. 17. Revd. 6 Aug. 1821

Rid Yourselves of Ultramaria

Letter 5. Submission impossible

'.2. Cortes unwilling

Letter Under Code Ultramarian submission impossible /hopeless/. Much more &c.

II. Much more detrimental, in this same point of view, would the dominion in question, or any attempt to exercise it over Spanish America, or any part of that vast country, of course, be, to the interest of the subject many in Spain, upon the supposition of repugnance, in any part of the other hemisphere.

As the repugnance encreased, or were thought to encrease or were pretended to be encreasing, so would the expence, of the preparations made for surmounting it. It would encrease, in proportion to the number of the provinces in which the discontent had place, and in proportion to the apparent comparative number and force of the discontented in each province: and so, in case of disobedience, or revolt, in proportion to the extent of it.

In Spanish America, the probable existence, and, in case of its existence, the probable magnitude, of the repugnance, discontent, disobedience, and revolt respectively, would, of course, receive encrease from every distinguishable arrangement, by which relief, or benefit, were seen to be endeavoured to be attended to the people of Spain: - to the people of Spain, subject many, ruling few, or both together - at the expence of Spanish America, in general, or of any portion of that vast expence.

In speaking of the repugnance, and its consequences, I have spoken of it, as yet, as no more than probable. But the truth is - it will be - it is already - matter of certainty: of certainty - not merely in this or that one of these provinces, but in every one of them: of certainty, sooner or later, but, at the furthest, not very late. It arises out of the very nature of the relation thus endeavoured to be maintained or restored, coupled with that of the change by which every such endeavour has been preceded: the change, I mean - the change, no less vast than salutary, that has been effected in the character of the constitutional branch of the law. In case of separation as to government, the interests of the two countries are, (it will be seen further on), most intimately united. But, in case of unity of government, their interests of those same parties are, (it will be seen presently), unchangeably opposite.

Not less surely irreconciliable is this opposition, there, as it stands, undeniable. Supposing it possible, that, by this or that particular arrangement, so long as submitted to in Spanish America, advantage in the shape in question - a pecuniary shape - could be made to accrue to Spain - it could not be made to accrue to Spain, but disadvantage would, in a correspondent shape, be felt in Spanish America: and the disadvantage in the subject country, could not possibly fail to be greater than the advantage received in the seat of empire. In regard to every possible pecuniary shape in which the advantage to Spain could have existence, this has been shown already. From the county subject to the dominion, to the county in which the seat of that same dominion is, whatever it were that were received would be to be conveyed: and part of the disadvantage - and that an inevitable one - not to look out for any others - would be composed of the expence of conveyance.

Thus