9 Nov r 1811

Evidence

3

1. Theoret

Ch Persuasion

§.3 Reid & Campbel

3

Having judgment itself for its opponent this hypothesis could not but find itself labouring under very serious difficulties.

1. Out of two cases, of each of which the existence is equally undividable, for one alone did it so much as take upon itself to give account. For the act of belief as often as examined upon testimony, it provided a believing sense—a testimony-believing sense. But while in some instances testimony is believed in others it is disbelieved: of them to account for belief of testimony there be a need of a believing sense to account for disbelief of testimony there exits not less need of a disbelieving sense.

The believing sense being infallible, how is it with the disbelieving sense? If this be not infallible likewise, [...?] will be expected to account for the difference.

If both be alike infallible, here we every now and then have two senses one pronouncing a fact true, the other pronouncing the same thing not true: each contradicting the other, and both of them infallible.