1819 March 10

Jug Util

Verity

7

Price & Campbel

I. Price & Campbel

(7)

Now to apply D r Price's lottery to the case of miracles see the mass of supposition that must /would require to/ be added to it. Let it be the raising a man from the dead. If it be by the odds of a million to one that the improbability is to be represented, then the addition to this case must be this: of every million and one men that have died one has been raised from the dead by a word spoken to him /spoken by somebody—spoken by any body -/: In all past instances this has been the case: and in all future ones, it will be seen to be—This being assumed if so it be that of any such resurrection—a rumour reaches your ears, improbable as in this sense of the word improbability it will be—in the improbability you will see no sufficient cause for disbelieving it.

As for Dr Campbel, he took Hume for an adversary: the text of Hume in his Essay on Miracles for a subject of reference, to whom we are indebted for other works /another work/ really useful. In Hume's mode of putting the case there was an inappropriateness in the looseness of expression: Campbel laid hold of it, and probably may to some extent, be seen to have had the advantage of time. And why should be not have as good a right to his believing sense as David Hume to Hutchisons or to the Lord Shaftesbury's, or the trumping Lord's, or his own moral sense?

Note (1)

(a) Having as well as Hume a moral sense, Beattie found that in writing against /by his Essay on/ miracles, not to speak of other writings Hume had proved himself to be a ‘ murderer of souls’: and for this, the [...?] Priest could have gladly hanged the philosopher, that he might be tormented to all eternity so much the sooner

and for his hunger and thirst after this righteousness he /the religionist/ got from the King a pension by which he was enabled so much the sooner to drink himself to death.