18 May 1805

Evidence

Evils causes

ch. -----------

' Effects on --------

Effects of reform on the no of judges

In the aggregate assemblage of the ends of procedure are included in substance /in purport/ though not in name /tenor/, two distinguishable objects: 1. the raising to its maximum the number of well-founded, i.e. non-temerarious and bonâ fide suits: the ----- to it minimum the number of ill-founded, i.e. temerarious and malâ fide suits. It is rarely by means of a suit /by means of a legal ----/ as often as the occasion a just occasion for the demand - a just cause of suit - presents itself, that the prescriptions of substantive law in that regard can be fulfilled.

I say the increasing the number of well-founded, bonâ fide suits is among the ends of procedure /legislation/. Not that any increase in the number of suits of any kind /description/ is not in itself an evil (it is always so in virtue of the attendant vexation and expence attending them - it can never fail of being so) but in as much as so far as it extends, in so far as is necessary to the attainment of a preponderant good. Not that by the production of such ----- it may not happen to a law to be productive not only of evil but of preponderant evil: - but /that/ where the evil is thus preponderant, it is the work and product not only of the adjective system of law, but of the same /correspondent/ part or other of the substantive.

By the ambiguity of its tenor, it may but too easily happen to the substantive branch of the law to give birth to a /an almost endless/ multitude of suits: but in this case the cause /fault/ of the evil lies solely in that branch of the law not in any respect in the adjective - not in the system of procedure.

A case in which a misfortune of this head is still more apt to happen is that where the corresponding article of the substantive law in question has no tenor at all: which is the case in so far as the substantive branch of the body of the law remains /is suffered to remain/ in the form, or rather the no-form of jurisprudential law; but of this more fully in its place.