21 April 1804

[...?] Mode

Summary

In perhaps every established system of adj...tive[?] law, a distinction /decision[?]/ glancing as the above, and presenting, upon the face of the appellations bestowed on the con[...?] branches, the appearance of an approach to it /obscure perception of it/, would I am inclined to think be found. You find it in the systems derived from the Roman Law in German Law for instance and in French[?]. You find it in the English. Regular procedure: summary procedure, these are the appellations employed: but upon the very face of this description /verbal covering/, symptoms may be discovered of the injustice that lurks beneath. It imparts[?] /[...?]/conveys the idea/ a contradiction a repugnancy between[?] the summary mode and the regular: as if there were a natural and necessary /universal/ incompatability between dispatch and regularity: between the avoidance of collateral injustice, and the disp...ation[?] /accomplishment/ of direct justice. If summary /If decided in a summary way, a cause/, it can not be accordence /decided/ to rule: if according to /decided/ rule, it can not be decided with dispatch.

Summary procedure /justice/ not according to /proceeding/ rule? what should hinder it? Is there one sort of cause more than another in which neither regulations nor instruction, are either necessary or conducive to the conferring the course of judication within /to/ the path of justice?

Judication proceeding according to rule not capable of being summary? what should hinder it? The cases - understand the individual cases - are indeed but too numerous, in which dispatch - the degree of dispatch capable of being given[?] in other cases without prejudice to justice - the direct justice of the case - could not be given, without the production of that capital[?][ inconvenience: but cases individual cases are not wanting in which the maximum of dispatch is favourable to the strictest justice. /the very course that would be indicated /prescribed/ by an attention, though it was an exclusive use, to the interests of direct justice.