24 Dec r 1806

Scotch Reform To L d Grenville

4 16(14

Resolut. 10

Advocate suspension

So much as to the effect: now as to the cause. Advocation may be at the instance of either side of the parties. But supposing it a different [...?] from appeal, and supposing the party to have the choice between that and appeal, and delay on the part of the Judge below not the misconduct complained of or apprehended, it is /seems/ difficult to conceive how in either side it should have any thing but oppression for its object, malâ fides for its cause delay, but supposition, neither experienced nor apprehended: decision - none given: therefore no misdecision in the case. What remains then for the possible object? If at the instances /prompts/ of the plaintiff, increase of vexation, delay and expence: for what else can be the effect of taking the cause out of the hands of the Court below? Had decision been his object, to what purpose take the cause out of the hands of that Court when it was to be had sooner? By delay, more delay, so far as success[?] in the cause i.e. obtainment of the benefit demanded was the real object a plaintiff has every thing to lose, nothing to gain: but if oppression be his object, vexation and expence, the inseparable concomitants of the /a/ removal of the cause into another, especially of (as it is usually is) a more distant, Court - vexation and expence ensure /secure //put that object into his hand/ to him the accomplishment of it.