July 1811 July 4 + + E

10 V ad Juperbriam

Fallacies Fallacies Ch

5 1

5

' 5 Duration of laws - possible erroneous arrangements in relation to it.

In respect of duration, in all these cases there is one and the same sort of arrangement presents itself as being, so far as it is in the nature of the case practicable, the only one that is conformable not only to the dictates of general utility as presented by reason and experience as well as /but also/ to the most generally /extensively/ prevalent usage, to little less than uninterrupted usage.

This arrangement is that which has place where the duration of the law in question is understood to be perpetual, /continue in force so long and so far only/ except in so far as by the sovereignty in question no abrogation of it or alteration in it by place

Defeasible perpetuity is the name by which in two words or in one word this most ordinary and natural mode of duration may be characterised. [...?] the sort of arrangement presented by the principle of defeasible perpetuity.

In each of the four first of these six cases this arrangement is in the nature of the case a practicable one: in each of those cases the perpetuity is in the nature of the case defeasible.

In the fifth and sixth alone, it is not in the nature of the case practicable: in neither of those cases is the perpetuity in the nature of the case defeasible

In the /The/ case of an incorporative Union between two sovereignties /sovereignties is that of a contract, in virtue of which/ the two contracting parties, thew two original sovereignties are both of them extinct and gine.[?] Unless in so far as in and by the act of incorporation special provision is made for the purpose there exist no person, no party, by whom any such operation as that of dissolving the union and replacing /restoring/ the two Guardian[?] /re-instating/ sovereignties in /into/ their original state is capable of being performed. There exists no person /not person or persons/ other than the aggregate body of the whole community expected, by whom any such restitutive can be so much as called for /demanded/ and claimed. /demanded./