6 June 1810 §.3

Influence

Ch. Influence undue & not

§.3. Influence where proper

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But in the case in which it is by understanding as well as upon understanding that the influence is exercised, are there not (it may be asked) cases in which the influence is with propriety termed undue? In arguments[?] - the reasons that are employed - suppose it to be to the imagination merely, to the passions merely that they are addressed: or if to the judgment - suppose them to be all of them of a fallacious or deceptitious nature and tendency - of the class of reasonings /arguments/ called sophisms or fallacies? among /of/ all these is there any one which exercised or endeavoured to be exercised upon the understanding by the understanding is not undue?

My answer is - that in these cases to say that the influence exercised is undue is an expression to which the imputation of impropriety could hardly be attributed /affixed/. But in this case to avoid ambiguity, the better way seems to be, in speaking of the influence - not to say that it is undue, but that it is proper influence - influence of a proper species, unduly exercised, exercised in an undue manner.  Add matter influential matter, not undue being matter operating not immediately on the will.

Be this as it may, the practical use of the distinction is this. Influence of understanding over understanding, even when unduly exercised as above, can only to a theoretical purpose be termed undue: it is only the influence of will over will that to a practical purpose can generally speaking at least, be termed undue. Influence of will over will is, when unduly exerted, capable of being repressed by legal prohibition, enforced by penal inflictions: nor is there any body that in such a case would be inclined to object to the use of these.