1819 May 30

Disfranchising or Defence of Ballot

Ballot note 1. Bribery

4

What must be acknowledged is, that even under the ballot, one circumstance there is by which the efficiency of it in the character of a preservative against bribery would be limited by this circumstance. The bribe might be so ordered, as not to be received but in case of Candidate on whose behalf for whose support it was given were returned.

Under these circumstances, the efficiency of corruption in this form would naturally be, other circumstances equal in proportion to the smalness of the number of the Electors {by whose votes the choice were determined.} Suppose the number to a certain degree small, the bribe might be so large, that though the receipt of it were made dependent on this contingency, the nature of the contingency would not to such a degree diminish the value of the bribe, as to prevent the acceptance of it.

Suppose the number to a certain degree large, the disrepute and danger remaining the same, and the time during which the secret /bargain/ might transpire being thus protracted the uncertainty of the benefit might in the eyes of the Elected render the bargain upon the whole an ineligible one

But this cause of inefficiency applies only to the present system, and under the present system only to such boroughs as are close, or want not much of being so. In the case of Electoral districts of such amplitude as under radical reform all such districts would be, it would have little application: none at all under that shortlivedness by which in virtue of another feature of radical reform, the marketable value of seats could be so effectually reduced.