+ 1819 Oct. 3

Parl. Reform Bill

§.5. Election Apparatus

§.8. Election, how

Art | | Secrecy

4

For clearness take an example. On the occasion of the last Election for Westminster, of two Candidates, the Honourable George Lamb and M r John Cam Hobhouse, the former succeeded, the latter failed. On that occasion Among all those by whom the choice so made was approved, can there have have been so much as one, who, on any occasion would have professed to ground such an approbation on any other supposition than this – namely, that, on the side of the successful Candidate the votes given in conformity to the wishes of the respective voters were more numerous than on the side of the unsuccessful candidate? Assuredly not: if so, then, by all persons by whom that choice was approved, it could not but have been admitted, that on the opposite supposition – the evil of Miselection, as above described would have had place.

Now then in this state of things, how stands the question of superior fitness as between the open and the secret mode?

1. In the open mode, easily to an indefinite extent the direction given to the votes may have been opposite to that pointed to by the wishes of the voters. Why? because in that mode causes more than one have place, any one of which is in its nature capable of being abundantly sufficient for the production of that undesirable effect: namely expectation of of eventual evil, and expectation of eventual good:

evil