17 Sept. 1803

Evidence

Instructions

Considerations

2. Interest Pecuniary

The case in which the testimony of a plaintiff in support of his own demand, supposing the testimony wilfully false appears to have the fairest chance, is where upon the face of it, the fact not having come under the cognizance either of the defendant, or of any body else but the plaintiff, the supposed false testimony of the plaintiff has neither the testimony of the defendant nor any other testimony to contradict it. But in this case it is provided that though by the supposition the defendant has it not in his power to give any specific testimony, whereby the force of the Plaintiff's testimony may be counteracted, yet it should be matter of obligation as well as right, on the part of the Defendant, after hearing the Plaintiff's testimony, to declare whether he himself gives credit to it - whether he decidedly believes it, decidedly disbelieves it, or remains in doubt. If he believes it, so may the Judge with still less difficulty: if he is in doubt, no doubt from such a quarter may in the conception /mind/ of the Judge afford some confirmation of the plaintiff's testimony. If the Defendant, decidedly and firmly can take upon him to say that he disbelieves it, and no confirmation comes in aid of it from any other source, personal evidence or real, direct or circumstantial, there seems little likelyhood that the Judge should suffer his decision to be governed by such scanty and suspicious evidence. To testimony thus circumstanced it will oftener happen to be disbelieved when true than to be believed /credited/ when false.