10 March 1808

Letter V

§.6. Reasons

Ends of Justice

In every instance how great so ever be the evil, it is only in so far as in the case where misconduct on the part of some human agent is discernible, that the evil can with propriety receive the denomination of an injustice: or at any rate, it is only thus far that any act of injustice can, with propriety, be said to have place. Witness the cases where the injustice sustained, (whether by non-administration of satisfaction as for wrong, or non-collation of some right which at the instance of a demandant ought to have been conferred on him by the hand of the Judge, or by non-administration of punishment to a defendant at the instance of a demandant) here for its immediate cause non-demand on the plaintiff's side, or non-justiciability on the defendant's side, (i.e. on the part of him who should have been made defendant) or after demand made, desistment, on the plaintiff's side.

But in several instances where the evil, designated by this or that denomination, appears not to be capable of being spoken of either as being itself an injustice, an act of injustice, or as having any act of injustice for its cause - at least for its immediate cause, yet on a closer examination into the chance of causes and effects, it will be seen to have at bottom its root in misconduct some where, viz. either on the part of the Judge, or on the part of the system, i.e. of the legislator, in this behalf, ad hoc.